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DETERMINATIVE STATUTE:
Utah Code Annotated § 17-12-44 (1992) states:
In any case founded on contract, when any part of the
principal or interest shall have been paid, or an
acknowledgment of an existing liability, debt or claim,
or any promise to pay the same, shall have been made, an
action may be brought within the period prescribed for
the same after such payment, acknowledgment or promise;
but such acknowledgment or promise must be in writing,
signed by the party to be charged thereby. When a right
of action is barred by the provisions of any statute, it
shall be unavailable either as a cause of action or
ground of defense.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Respondent concurs with Appellants' jurisdictional statement.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court correctly rule that certain of the

claims in the Defendants' Counterclaim were barred by the statute
of limitations?

In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the

standard of review is that the appellate court accord no deference
to

the

Buchanan

trial
v.

court's

Hansen,

ruling

and

review

it

for

820 P.2d 908, 908 (Utah 1991).

correctness.
The appellate

court is to apply the same standard as that applied by the trial
court.
2.

Durham

v.

Margetts,

571 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 1977).

Did the trial court correctly rule that the Defendants had

failed to state a claim, as a matter of law, as to certain other
claims in their Counterclaim?

In reviewing a grant of summary

judgment, the standard of review is that the appellate court accord
no

deference

correctness.

to

the

Buchanan

trial
v.

court's

Hansen,

ruling

and

review

it

for

820 P.2d 908, 908 (Utah 1991).

The appellate court is to apply the same standard as that applied
by the trial court.

Durham v.

Margetts,

571 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah

1977) .
3.

In the event this Court should find that the trial court

erred in its ruling that certain of the Defendants' claims were
barred by the statute of limitations, should the dismissal still be
upheld because the Defendants have failed to make their case as a
matter of law?

In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the
1

standard of review is that the appellate court accord no deference
to

the

trial

Buchanan

v.

court's

Hansen,

ruling

and

review

it

for

820 P.2d 908, 908 (Utah 1991).

correctness.
The appellate

court is to apply the same standard as that applied by the trial
court.

Durham v.

4.

Margetts,

571 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 1977).

Did the trial court correctly rule that certain of the

claims in the Defendants' affirmative defenses were barred by the
statute of limitations?

In reviewing a grant of summary judgment,

the standard

is that the appellate court accord no

deference

to

correctness.

of review
the

trial

Buchanan

v.

court's
Hansen,

ruling

and

review

it

for

820 P.2d 908, 908 (Utah 1991).

The appellate court is to apply the same standard as that applied
by the trial court.

Durham v.

Margetts,

571 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah

1977) .
5. Did the trial court correctly rule that the Defendants had
failed to state a claim, as a matter of law, as to certain other
claims in their affirmative defenses?

In reviewing a grant of

summary judgment, the standard of review is that the appellate
court accord no deference to the trial court's ruling and review it
for correctness.
1991).

Buchanan

v.

Hansen,

820 P. 2d 908, 908

(Utah

The appellate court is to apply the same standard as that

applied by the trial court.

Durham

v. Margetts,

571 P. 2d 1332,

1334 (Utah 1977) .
6.

In the event this Court should find that the trial court

erred in its ruling that certain of the Defendants' affirmative
2

defenses were barred by the statute of limitations, should the
dismissal still be upheld because the Defendants have failed to
make their case as a matter of law?

In reviewing a grant of

summary judgment, the standard of review is that the appellate
court accord no deference to the trial court's ruling and review it
for correctness.
1991).

Buchanan

v.

Hansen,

820 P.2d 908, 908 (Utah

The appellate court is to apply the same standard as that
Durham v. Margetts,

applied by the trial court.

571 P. 2d 1332,

1334 (Utah 1977).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of Case and Course of Proceeding
This case involves a series of claims between State Bank of
Southern Utah, a Utah banking corporation ("State Bank"), and Troy
Hygro Systems, Inc. ("Troy Hygro"), and its principals, who are
State Bank's borrowers.

Troy Hygro and its principals, who were

the Defendants at the trial court, will be referred to herein
collectively as "Borrowers" or "Defendants."
funding

for

Troy

Hygro's

business

State Bank provided

operation

greenhouse grown tomatoes in New Castle, Utah.

consisting

of

The Troy Hygro

business in Utah has failed, and Troy Hygro now attempts to blame
all of its woes on State Bank.
There are three separate loans in issue. The Borrowers allege
six separate counterclaims, and four separate affirmative defenses,
some of which apply to more than one loan. And, because the loans
were given at different times and under different circumstances,
3

the issues in relation to each vary. The trial court carefully and
meticulously considered each claim, as applied
loan, and entered its rulings.

separate

This Court must do likewise.

The three loans are: a loan made on October 7, 1985, in the
amounI: c>f $325,000; a loan made on February 10, 1987, in the amount
of $60,000; and a loan made on November 7, 1988, in the amount of
$49,000.

The three loans were all to the same parties and were

secured by the same collateral.

The loans went into default, and

on December 13, 1990, State Bank filed its Complaint to collect the
loans and to foreclose the collateral securing them.
The Defendants filed their Answer and Counterclaim on June 7,
1991.

The Counterclaim alleges seven separate causes of action.

The seventh, which is for accounting and declaratory and injunctive
relief was dismissed by stipulation of the parties.

Thus, six

causes of action of the Counterclaim are before this Court for
review, all of which will be discussed in detail below:
1

Breach of Agreement to Fund.

2.

Willful Breach of Contract and Economic Duress.

3.

Promissory Estoppel.

4.

Negligent Structuring and Disbursal.

5.

Control and Self Dealing.

6.

Breach of Duties of Good Faith and Fair Dealing.

The Defendants also asserted affirmative defenses to State
Bank's claims.

They have attempted to veil the precise issues

relating to the affirmative defenses by improperly combining them
4

with the counterclaim issues together under one general analysis.
For example, at page 7 of their Brief, the Appellants state, in
relation to the affirmative defenses:
Claims [similar to the counterclaim] were asserted by way
of affirmative defenses contained in Troy's answer.
This

is not

important.

totally

correct, and

the

differences

could

be

As a matter of fact, even though there were many

affirmative defenses originally pled by the Appellants, only four
were plead as both affirmative defenses and counterclaims, those
being breach of fiduciary duty (tenth defense), breach of duties of
good faith and fair dealing (eleventh defense), economic duress
(fourteenth defense) and improper disbursement (seventh defense).
After discovery, State Bank filed a Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment seeking the dismissal of the Defendants' counterclaim.
State Bank sought dismissal under two separate arguments, first
that the claims were time barred by the applicable statute of
limitations and second that the Appellants had failed to make a
prima

facie

trial court

case, as a matter of law.
carefully

analyzed

each

Argument was heard and the
cause of action

of the

Counterclaim, as applied to the law, and ultimately granted State
Bank's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on all causes but one.
By order dated July 9, 1992, and entered July 16, 1992, the Court
carefully articulated its findings (R-0490-0495).

A copy of the

trial court's July 9, 1992, Order is included in the Addendum as
Exhibit A. The Order dismisses some of the causes of action on the
5

statute of limitations and some for failure to make a prima

facie

case as a matter of law. These counterclaims wi I I be discussed in
detail below.
State Bank then filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
its Complaint.

Troy opposed the motion arguing, among other

things, that its affirmative defenses barred State Bank's action.
The hearing was held on October 9, 1992, and, after taking the
matter under advisement, the court granted State Bank's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment except for two issues.

Contrary to the

statement of the Appellant at page 10 of their Brief, the Court's
dismissal of the Defendants' defenses was not entirely based upon
the statute of limitations. The court's rulings on two of the four
issues were based upon the Defendants' failure to make its case, as
a matter of law.

(See discussion under Point IV, below.)

A copy

of the trial court's November 13, 1992, Order is included in the
Addendum as Exhibit B.
In granting both of the summary judgments, the trial court
reserved the issue as to the amount of attorney's fees and the
alleged improper disbursement of the February 10, 1987 loan.
trial was held on December 10, 1992, on those issues.

The

At the

trial, Troy Hygro did not present any evidence on any issues.
Thus, the trial court ruled in State Bank's favor finding that
there was no improper disbursement of the February 10, 1987 loan.

6

STATEMENT OF FACT8
1.

Sometime in early 1985, Troy Hygro approached State Bank

for the purpose of obtaining a loan for additional greenhouses to
be constructed upon property which Troy Hygro leased.

(R-1607

(Deposition of James Markell, p. 33)).
2. Each of the parties knew that the loan being sought was to
be approved by the Small Business Administration of the United
States Government ("SBA").

(R-466 (Affidavit of Michael R. Kehl,

f 6)).
3.

Troy Hygro now claims that during this loan application

process, State Bank committed and promised that the loan would be
granted and funded immediately upon the approval by the SBA.
However, even the testimony of the only two witnesses testifying
for the Defendants in this case, Michael R. Kehl and James Markell,
proves that no such promise or commitment was ever made.

(See

discussion under Point IA.2., below).
4.

There is no written document of any kind which obligates

State Bank to advance the loan immediately upon SBA approval, nor
at any other specific time.
5.

On

September

3, 1985, the SBA

authorization for the new loan.

issued

its written

(R-381 (Affidavit of Leland 0.

Fife, f 11)).
6.

However, by the time the SBA approval was given, State

Bank had other existing loans outstanding up to the maximum allowed
by the regulatory limits governing State Bank.
7

Therefore, State

Bank did not immediately lend the funds pursuant to the SBA
approval.
7.

(R-381 (Fife Affid., 5 11)).
During the negotiations and processes to complete and

obtain the SBA approval, State Bank did not know it would be out of
money when the SBA approval was granted.

The Bai ik's lending

capacity varies from time to time, and there is no way the Bank
could have known at any time significantly prior to September 3,
1985, that it would not have money to lend when the SBA approval
was given.
8.

(R-381 (Fife Affid., ffl 13-14)).

State Bank moved as quickly as it could to remedy the

situation. Within thirty (3 0) days, the Bank had funds to lend and
the loan was closed on or about October 7, 1985.

(R-382 (Fife

Affid., f 15)).
9.

By everyone's admission, immediately prior to Troy Hygro

signing the loan documents on October 7, 1985, Troy Hygro was not
obligated to complete the loan.

Nevertheless, Troy Hygro elected

to borrow the funds and executed the Note, Trust Deed and other
loan documents.
date of the loan.

State Bank advanced the $325,000 on or about the
(R-380 (Fife Affid., ff 7-8), R-1564, 1947 (Kehl

Deposition, pp. 207, 379)).
10.

To remedy cash flow problems, and to provide for capital

purchases, on February 10, 1987, State Bank loaned an additional
$60,000 to Troy Hygro.

(R-382

(Fife Affid.

f 17)).

The

Defendants executed the Note and security documents to memorialize

8

the loan.

(R-499-502.

(Affidavit of Leland 0. Fife dated August

13, 1992 ffl 6-8)).
11.

On November 7, 1988, the Defendants obtained another loan

from State Bank for the purpose of facilitating the takeover of the
business by one of the Kehl brothers, Keith Kehl, and his wife
Karen Sue Kehl.
12.

The Plaintiff filed this foreclosure action on December

13, 1990.

The Defendants filed their Answer and Counterclaim on

June 7, 1991.
13.

The Plaintiff made a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

as to the issues raised in the Defendants7 Counterclaim.

The

Defendants filed an affidavit and a memorandum opposing the motion.
Argument was held on June 24, 1992.

On July 9, 1992, the court

entered its order dismissing the Counterclaim, except one part of
one cause of action.
14.

(R-490-495).

Then, the Plaintiff made a Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment as to its Complaint.

The Defendants resisted the motion,

primarily relying on their affirmative defenses. Argument was held
on October 9, 1992.

On that date, the court granted the motion,

except for one part of one affirmative defense.
15.

Troy

Hygro

claims that the

(R-699-700).

loan proceeds

February 10, 1987, loan were improperly disbursed.
only issue that went to trial.

from

the

This is the

At the trial, Lee Fife testified

that the proceeds were properly disbursed consistent with the loan
documents.

(R-1285-1303 (Reporter's Trial Transcript, December 10,
9

1992)).

Troy Hygro did not put on any proof as to the alleged

wrongful disbursement of the February 10, 1987 loan.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.
of

The trial court properly dismissed four of the six causes

action

in

the

Counterclaim

based

upon

the

statute

of

limitations.
2.

Even if the trial court erred in dismissing those four

counterclaims based on the statute of limitations, the claims
should be dismissed as a matter of law because the Defendants did
not make a prima
3.

facie

case which would entitle it to recovery.

The fifth and sixth causes of action of the Counterclaim

were properly dismissed by the trial court because the Defendants
failed to make a prima

facie

case.

4. The Defendants have failed to marshall the proof necessary
to show that the trial court's rulings were not correct in relation
to the affirmative defenses raised by the Defendants.
5.

The arguments made by the Defendants in opposition to the

Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in relation to the
affirmative defenses fail as a matter of law.

The defenses in

relation to the October 1985 loan and the February 1987 loan were
never

raised

considered.

as

affirmative

defenses

and

thus

should

not

be

Even if they are considered, they are barred by the

applicable statute of limitations because they are in reality
counterclaims, not defenses, and because the Defendants did not

10

make a prima

facie

case independent of the statute of limitations

issues.
6. The Defendants did not establish a prima facie

case in the

trial court on their affirmative defenses of economic duress, and
breach of duties of good faith, fair dealing and fiduciary duty,
and thus the trial court's summary judgment overruling those
affirmative defenses must be sustained.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON EACH
OF THE COUNTERCLAIMS
This Court will notice a decidedly different approach between
State Bank's Brief and Defendants' Brief.

The Defendants fail to

separately address the six separate causes of action in the
Counterclaim, and the four separate affirmative defenses alleged in
the Answer.

The

law requires that each

separate

claim be

separately addressed. Au v. Au, 626 P.2d 173 (Hawaii 1981). Since
the issues are fact sensitive to a degree, and since many involve
separate

analysis, the Respondent

will

address

each

of

the

Defendants' counterclaims one at a time. A copy of the Defendants'
Answer and Counterclaim is included in the Addendum as Exhibit C.
A.

First Cause of Action, Breach of Contract.

Defendants

first claim that State Bank was legally bound to disburse the
initial $325,000 loan immediately upon SBA approval; in other
words, that there was a contract obligating State Bank to fund the
11

loan

immediately

when

SBA

(Counterclaim f5 7, 21-22)).

approval

was

given.

(R-104,

107

There is no writing evidencing the

obligation, and thus the claimed contract is oral.

The trial court

found that the breach alleged by the Defendants occurred on or
about September 3, 1985, when the approval by the SBA was given to
State Bank and State Bank did not advance the funds.
dated July 9, 1992, f 3)).

(R-491 (Order

The trial court further found that

since there was no writing to evidence the obligation, the contract
was oral and thus governed by the four-year statute of limitations.
(R-491, 491a, 492 (Order dated July 9, 1992)).
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 provides that the following have a
four-year period of limitations:
(1) An action upon a contract, obligation or liability
not founded upon an instrument in writing.
The alleged cause of action accrued on September 3, 1985.

The

Counterclaim was not filed until June 7, 1991, some five years and
nine months

later.

The fact that the Defendants' claims are

asserted by way of counterclaim, rather than a complaint itself,
makes no difference, since the statutes of limitation apply equally
to both counterclaims and affirmative complaints.
Lindsay

v.

Woodward,

See

generally,

5 Utah 2d 183, 299 P.2d 619 (1956).

The Defendants7 only argument relating to the counterclaims
asserts that the loan documents from the loan which was ultimately
granted on October 7, 1985, are sufficient to constitute a writing
so that the six-year provision of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23 apply.
12

Preliminarily, the Court should note that the Defendants state at
page 24 of their Brief, that it is undisputed that State Bank
agreed to have the funds available immediately upon SBA approval.
That statement is absolutely false.

It is disputed.

State Bank

denies that it ever agreed to fund the loan at any given time. The
page reference cited by Defendants does not sustain the proposition
stated.
The documents upon which the Defendants rely do not invoke the
six-year statute of limitations for two reasons.

First, the

documents relate to an entirely different contract. The Defendants
attempt to rely on the loan documents from the October 7, 1985,
loan as the writings sufficient to engage the six-year statute of
limitations.

But, the contract which they claim was breached was

not the loan itself, but a prior oral agreement to fund the loan at
a specified time.

The oral agreement claimed by Defendants was

allegedly breached on September 3, 1985, when State Bank couldn't
fund the loan when SBA approval was given. There are no documents
relating to that agreement. The actual loan documents weren't even
prepared until a month after the contract upon which Defendants'
sue was allegedly

breached

and

several months

after

it was

allegedly entered.

The loan documents from October 7, 1985, are

part of different contract.
Secondly, even if it were all part of the same contract, the
material terms of that contract claimed by Defendants (promise to
fund the loan immediately upon SBA approval) is not written.
13

If a

contract is part oral and part written, the statute of limitations
regarding oral contracts applies.
Miami,

Florida,

Florida,

v.

Capital

701 P.2d 903, 907 (Kan. 1985); Moran

724 P.2d 396, 399 (Wash. App. 1986).
Miami,

Chilson

supra,

In Chilson

Bank

v.

v. Capital

of

Stowell,
Bank

of

the court succinctly stated the controlling

law:
A contract which is partly in writing and partly oral is
in legal effect an oral contract so far as the statute of
limitations is concerned. The writing necessary to have
the additional protection of the five-year statute must
be full and complete in itself so as not to require proof
of extrinsic facts to establish all essential contractual
terms.
Id.

at 907 (citations omitted).
At best, the contract alleged by Defendants is part oral and

part written.

It is treated as an oral contract and the four-year

statute of limitations applies.
The Defendants rely exclusively on the case Evans
Brothers

Farms,

17 Utah 2d 375, 499 P.2d

273

v.

Pickett

(1972), for the

proposition that any oral promises made while the parties were
negotiating a written contract are within the six-year statute of
limitations.

The Pickett

Defendants at all.

Brothers

Farms

case does not help the

While the contract in that case was prepared

after the contract was allegedly entered, it contained all material
terms, including the one sued upon.

The documents relied upon by

the Defendants do not contain the material term which they claim
was breached and thus the four-year statute of limitations applies.
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The trial court granted summary judgment on this cause of
action based on the statute of limitations.

Other grounds for

dismissal were argued. The trial court never reached them because
of its ruling on the statute of limitations.

Even if this Court

finds that the trial court erred in its statute of limitation
ruling, the Defendants have failed to make their prima
and thus the dismissal must be upheld.
Recreation

v.

Cedar

Hills

Development,

facie

See, e.g.,

case
Global

614 P. 2d 155, 157 (Utah

1980) (trial court's decision can be sustained on grounds other
than those relied on by trial court if grounds have been argued and
briefed

by both parties, were presented

to trial court for

adjudication, and do not require resolution of disputed factual
issues).

Cf. Viehweg

v.

Thompson,

647 P.2d 311, 314-315 (Idaho

1982) (error by trial court in ruling that counterclaim was barred
by statute of limitations was harmless because of trial court's
finding on comparative negligence).
1.

THE ALLEGED CONTRACT FAILS BECAUSE THERE WAS NO MUTUALITY
OF OBLIGATION.

In order for a contract to be binding, there must be mutuality
of obligation; that is, each of the parties must be bound to their
respective performance under the terms of the contract.
general rule is well stated as follows:
[Mjutuality of obligation is essential to the validity of
an executory bilateral contract which is based solely on
mutual promises or covenants and unless both parties are
legally bound, so that each may hold the other liable for
its breach, the contract lacks mutuality and neither
party is bound.
15

The

Security

Bank

1986), quoting

& Trust

v.

Bogard,

494 N.E.2d 965, 969 (Ind. App.

17 C.J.S. Contracts § 100(1) (1963).

In this case, both State Bank and the Defendants acknowledge
that the Borrowers were not bound at any point to complete the
loan.

(R-1947 (Kehl Deposition, p. 379), R-380 (Fife Affidavit, f

9), R-1664 (Markell Deposition, p. 90), stating "I would say, we
didn't have a commitment but they were committed")) . In fact, when
it was apparent that State Bank did not have the funds to loan Troy
Hygro, the completed SBA package was given to Mr. Markell so that
he could try to find financing using that package through another
bank

(SBA approvals

are

assignable).

(R-1650-1653

Deposition, pp. 76-79), R-381 (Fife Affid., f 12)).

(Markell
Since the

Borrowers were not obligated to complete the loan, the requisite
element of mutuality of obligation is not present, and there was no
enforceable contract which could have been breached by State Bank.
The case Security

Bank and Trust

Co. v Bogard,

494 N.E.2d 965

(Ind. App. 1986), is virtually identical to the case at bar.

In

that case, a Mr. Bogard was a farmer in Indiana, who had done
business with Security Bank and Trust for 33 years. As he had done
for many previous years, Mr. Bogard went into the bank to take out
his 1983 credit line.

He was informed by the bank officers that

because of prior years carry over losses, the bank would need
additional collateral. There were discussions about the pledge of
additional property, but the loan committee turned down Bogard's
application.

Bogard then attempted to find financing elsewhere,
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but was unsuccessful.

Some time later, the bank filed an action

against Bogard because he was in default on existing promissory
notes.
Bogard claimed that the bank breached an oral contract to
renew his line of credit. The court held, as a matter of law, that
there was no contract upon which a breach could be found because
there was no mutuality of obligation.

In so holding the court

stated:
Here, Bogard was not legally bound to borrow the money
from Security. In fact, Bogard testified he unsuccessfully attempted to seek financing elsewhere in lieu of
obtaining a loan from Security. Because Bogard had no
obligation to obtain his financing from Security, any
alleged contract between Security and Bogard lacked
mutuality of obligation and was thus unenforceable.
Id.

at 968.

This is precisely the instant case.

Any alleged

contract fails as a matter of law because it lacked mutuality of
obligation.

A copy of the Security

Bank and Trust

Co.

v.

Bogard

case is included in the Addendum as Exhibit D.
2.

THE ALLEGED ORAL CONTRACT BETWEEN STATE BANK AND TROY
HYGRO IS TOO INDEFINITE TO GIVE RISE TO A CONTRACT.

In order for an oral contract to exist, there must be an
offer, acceptance, consideration, the terms must be definite, the
parties must have a sufficient understanding of the terms of the
contract so as to know what they are bound to do, and the existence
of the contract must be established by clear, unequivocal and
definite testimony, or other evidence of the same quality.
Harmon v. Greenwood,

596 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah 1979); Oberhansley
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See
v.

Earle,

572 P.2d 1384, 1386

Group

of

Utah,

Board

of State

Inc.,

(Utah 1977); Pingree

v.

Continental

558 P.2d 1317, 1321 (Utah 1976); Morgan

Lands,

v.

549 P.2d 695f 696 (Utah 1976) . The burden of

proving the existence of a contract is on the party seeking its
enforcement.
There

Oberhansley,

can

be

no

supra,

572 P.2d at 1386.

contract

unless

the

obligations

of

the

respective parties are spelled out with sufficient definiteness to
allow enforcement.
Hansen

v.

Snell,

Oberhansley

v. Earle,

supra,

572 P.2d at 1386;

11 Utah 2d 64, 354 P.2d 1070, 1072 (1960).

An

agreement that does not define the terms thereto cannot be enforced
as a contract because lack of definiteness is equivalent to a
failure of the meeting of the minds which is an essential element
See, Efco

to the formation of a contract.
Perrin,

Distributing,

Inc.

v.

412 P.2d 615, 616 (Utah 1966).
Courts have addressed the question of definiteness in the
Marine

context of a loan agreement between a bank and a borrower.
Midland

Bank v.

Herriot,

412 N.E.2d 908 (Mass. App. 1980) (finding

at summary judgment that there was no enforceable agreement where
significant provisions of a new loan, such as the term of the loan,
how it would be secured, manner

and timing

of disbursement,

events

of default and the manner and timing of interest payments remained
open) (emphasis added); Calosso
Beach,

v.

First

National

Bank of

Pompano

143 So.2d 343 (Fla. App. 1962) (there was no loan agreement

where the

essentials

of the agreement, such

18

as

the

time

for

advancement,

time and method of repayment, and rate of interest

were conspicuously absent) (emphasis added).
In summary, in order for an agreement to be binding, it must
be sufficiently definite as to its terms and requirements to enable
the court to determine what acts are to be performed and when
performance is complete, so that the court can fix definitely the
legal liability of the parties. Lessley
446 (Kan. 1986).

v. Hardage, 727 P. 2d 440,

Even by the Defendants' testimony, the contract

alleged in this case was not definite enough to be enforced.
Throughout their Brief, Defendants summarily state the key to
their entire case, that State Bank "promised to have the funds
available immediately upon SBA approval."
24) .

(Brief of Appellants at

Yet there is no admissible evidence anywhere

in the

record

stating that State Bank would fund the loan immediately upon SBA
approval.

Even the Defendants themselves don't say so.

In his

deposition, James Markell, the local Troy Hygro representative with
whom most of the discussions with the bank took place, gives a
chronological account of all things that were discussed between
Troy Hygro and State Bank. As to the alleged agreement to make the
loan and the advancement of funds, Mr. Markell testified:
A.

That up until approximately July of 1985, the

discussions with the bank were preliminary, and Mr. fife was
careful to make sure that everyone understood that there was
no commitment to loan.

(R-1607-1614, 1622-1624, 1629-1632

(Markell Deposition, pp. 33-40, 48-50, 55-58)).
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B.

Beginning in early July of 1985, the pressures began

to set in as far as the time table was concerned, and Mr.
Markell began to mention to Mr. Fife the urgency of getting
the loan closed.

(R-1637 (Markell Deposition, p. 63)).

C. Several times thereafter, Fife made the comments like
"it looks pretty good."

(R-1640-1642 (Markell Deposition, pp.

66-68)).
D.

When the verbal SBA approval was given, Fife stated

that it looked good, and that the bank would now do the formal
application.
E.

(R-1642-1643 (Markell Deposition, pp. 68-69)).

Thereafter, several times Mr. Fife indicated that the

loan would be coming soon.

(R-1644-1645, 1647-1650 (Markell

Deposition, pp. 70-71, 73-76)).
F.

Markell assumed the loan would be granted consistent

with the pro-formas and proposed construction schedule because
no one ever told Troy that it wouldn't be.

According to Mr.

Markell, "Probably saying nothing says it all."

Troy Hygro

submitted pro-formas early in the application process which
projected a commencement date of August 31, at the latest, and
since no one at State Bank said those dates couldn't be met,
the

Defendants

assumed

they would

be met.

(R-1659-1660

(Markell Deposition, pp. 85-86)).
G.

When the SBA written approval finally came, Mr. Fife

advised Mr. Markell that the funds were not available, and
that the bank would get the money, but he did not know when it
20

was going to be.
15-16,

(R-1649-1650, 1656 (Markell Deposition, pp.

82)).

Copies of each of these pages from the Markell deposition are
included in the Addendum as Exhibit E.
Similarly, in his deposition, Michael Kehl, the President of
Troy Hygro, outlines what things the bank said to him or did which
Troy Hygro claims rose to the level of obligation.
A.

He states:

The bank's commitment to lend was inherent in the

schedules that had been provided.

(R-1563 (Kehl Deposition,

p. 206)).
B.
the

It wasn't what the Bank said that forms the basis for

obligation,

but what

it didn't

say.

(R-1564

(Kehl

Deposition, p. 207)).
C.

The commitment was made as an integral part of the

construction

schedule

provided

as

part

of

application.

(R-1953 (Kehl Deposition, p. 385)).

the

loan

D. The agreement was implied because of the construction
schedule.
E.

(R-1953 (Kehl Deposition, p. 385)).
There was not an exact conversation where the bank

agreed to the construction schedule. (R-1954 (Kehl Deposition,
p. 386)).
F.

The Bank had every opportunity to advise Troy Hygro

if the construction schedule was unrealistic, but never did.
(R-1954 (Kehl Deposition, p. 386)).
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G.

The Bank never said that it could advance the funds

in accordance with any construction schedule•

(R-1954-1955

(Kehl Deposition, pp. 386-387)).
Copies of these pages from Michael Kehl's deposition are included
in the Addendum as Exhibit F.
Defendants also cite the Affidavit of Michael Kehl (R-466) for
their claim that State Bank promised to fund the loan immediately
upon SBA approval.

It too fails to state what they say it states.

First of all, the affidavit states inadmissible conclusions rather
than facts.
hearing.

State Bank objected to the affidavit at the time of

(R-1104, 1105 (Reporter's Hearing Transcript June 24,

1992, pp. 3-4)).

Secondly, to the extent that it is inconsistent

with the deposition testimony, it should not be allowed.
v.

Sill,

675 P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983).

Webster

Finally, even if the

affidavit is considered, all it says is that State Bank agreed to
lend the funds "pending SBA approval."

That is a far cry from the

allegation that the funds would be advanced "immediately upon SBA
approval."
As the Court can readily see, all of the proof relied on by
Defendants is conclusory in nature, and constitutes nothing more
than assumptions, predictions or expectations by Defendants.
summary, the Defendants7

claim that they provided

In

anticipated

construction schedules to the bank in February, and the parties
knew that SBA approval was required, and because the bank didn't
say it couldn't meet the schedules or that it wouldn't advance the
22

funds upon SBA approval, that it was bound to do so.
hold to the contrary.

The cases

The fact of the matter is, the bank was

doing its best to get the loan completed as quickly as it could (R382 (Fife Affidavit, f 10)).

There is a big difference between

working toward schedules and being bound by them.

The Defendants

have not bridged that difference.
The first essential element of contract, that is definiteness
of terms, is absent. Even taking the Defendants' claimed facts as
true, there is no way that either the parties or this Court could
determine what acts are to be performed and when performance is
complete.

Thus, the claimed contract fails, consistent with the

cases outlined above.

Lessley

v.

Hardage,

727 P. 2d 440 (Kan.

1986) .
In summary, the trial court's statute of limitations ruling
was correct.

And even if it was not correct, the contract fails

because there was no mutuality of obligation, and because the
alleged contract was not sufficiently definite even under the
Borrowers7 proof.

The trial court's ruling should be upheld

independent of the statute of limitation issues.
B.

Second Cause of Action, Willful Breach of Contract and
Economic Duress.

In their second cause of action, the Defendants restate their
breach of contract argument, state that it is willful, and then
state that the $325,000 loan and $60,000 loan were signed under
economic duress.

The allegation that the breach was willful adds
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nothing to the claims under the first cause of action and no
further mention need be made of it. The trial court found that the
Borrowers did not meet the proof on their claim for economic duress
and thus dismissed it.

(R-0494 (Order dated July 9, 1992)).

The Utah Supreme Court has mandated proof of three elements in
order to establish a claim of economic duress. Heglar
v. Stillman,

619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1980).

Ranch,

Inc.,

Those elements are:

(1) wrongful act by the acting party; (2) which puts initial party
in fear; (3) compelling him to do something against his will. See
generally,

v. Short,

604 P.2d 1191 (Colo. App. 1979); Frank

Electric,

Inc.,

Jorgenson,

1983); Nord v.

Eastside

Culver

Weisen

v.

664 P. 2d 226 (Ariz. App.

Association

Ltd.,

claim

economic

664 P.2d 4 (Wash. App.

1983) .
Defendants7

The

of

duress

in

these

circumstances fails, as a matter of law, on two grounds.
1.

THE ACTS OF THE BANK WERE NOT WRONGFUL.

The first element of a claim for economic duress requires that
the actions of the acting party be wrongful.
v. Stillman,

supra

were not wrongful.

at 1391.

Heglar

Ranch,

Inc.,

In this case, the acts of State Bank

Mr. Lee Fife states that at all times he was

doing his best to get the loan completed (R-380, 382 (Fife Affid.,
ff 10-15) ) . The Defendants admit that they were on good terms with
Mr. Fife, that he tried hard to do things right, and that the Bank
seemed to be doing its best to get the matter resolved.

(R-1869,

1951 (Kehl Deposition, pp. 300, 383)). Appellants have not pointed
24

to any proof to show that the acts of the Bank were wrongful, thus
the economic duress claim fails on the first element.
2.

THE BANK DID NOT "COMPEL" TROY HYGRO TO DO ANYTHING.

Finally, the last element of a cause of action for economic
duress, is that the acting party must compel the other to do
something against his will. Heglar

Ranch,

Inc.,

v. Stillman,

supra

at 1391. In this case, State Bank did not compel Troy Hygro to do
anything.
compelling

To the contrary, Troy Hygro knew that the Bank was not
it to go through with the

Deposition, p. 379)).

loan.

(R-1947

(Kehl

State Bank even went so far as to give the

completed SBA loan package to the Defendants so that they could try
to get the loan somewhere else.

(R-1650-1653 (Markell Deposition,

pp. 76-79), R-381 (Fife Affid., f 12)). Mr. Fife encouraged the
Defendants to try to get financing elsewhere.

(Id.)

On these

facts, it can hardly be said that State Bank "compelled" Troy Hygro
to complete the loan in October of 1985.
The

case

Heglar

Ranch,

Inc.,

v.

Stillman,

supra,

is

conceptionally controlling on this case. In that case one Juanita
Stillman had entered an agreement for the purchase of certain land
located in West Jordan, Utah.

The deal failed because she was

unable to secure the financing with which to pay the purchase price
and the escrow was therefore terminated.

A short time later the

party with whom she had been dealing advised her that they were
still willing to continue the deal, but insisted on the imposition
of additional conditions and covenants, including the execution of
25

a promissory note. The defendant Stillman balked at the additional
conditions, but nevertheless went through with the transaction.
She defaulted, and the plaintiff sued on the promissory note which
was imposed as the additional condition.

The defendant Stillman

asserted economic duress as a defense to the promissory note.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendant, and the decision was affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court.
The Court stated:
Moreover, defendants were not placed in such fear as
would deprive them of their free will—by defendant
Juanita Stillman7s own admission, had they chosen to walk
away from the negotiations,
the only consequence thereof
would have been the loss of whatever benefits
the deal
might have afforded them had it been closed.
To label as
"duress" such incentive to complete the transaction
would
have the effect
of permitting
any party to avoid a
contractual
obligation
on the ground the performance was
agreed to only because, in the absence of a promise, the
party would be denied the benefit of the bargain.
Id.
Inc.,

at 1391-1392 (emphasis added).
v. Stillman

A copy of the Heglar

Ranch,

case is included in the addendum as Exhibit G.

In the instant case, like Juanita Stillman, the Defendants
could have walked away from this transaction at any time. The only
consequence would have been the loss of the benefit of the
Plaintiff's loan. As is set forth in the language quoted above, to
extend the meaning of being "compelled" to Plaintiff's claims would
allow any party to any contract to claim economic duress, since
presumably every contract is entered for the financial or other
benefit of the contract. The Defendants were not compelled to act,
and the trial court was correct in dismissing the economic duress
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claim for the Defendants' failure to make a prima facie

case, as a

matter of law.
Had the trial court reached the statute of limitations issue,
it would have imposed the four-year statute of limitations and
would have dismissed the cause of action on that ground as well.
Under the statutory scheme for limitation of actions in Utah, there
are certain specifically stated periods for some types of action.
Then, for those not specifically mentioned, there is a "catch-all"
limitation of four years imposed.
(1992) .

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25

Since there is no specific period of limitation for

economic duress, it falls within the catch-all provisions of Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-25 and is four years.

The cause of action

obviously accrued when the notes were allegedly signed under
economic duress on October 7, 1985, and February 10, 1987.

The

action was not filed by the Defendants until more than four years
later. The claims of economic duress are barred by the statute of
limitations and the trial court's finding and order must be upheld
on this ground as well.
C.

Third Cause of Action; Promissory Estoppel.

Defendants7 third cause of action alleges that State Bank
promised to loan the funds immediately upon SBA approval and then
failed to do so.

In some ways this cause of action simply

rephrases the breach of contract claims under the first cause of
action.

The trial court found that the period of limitations for

promissory estoppel was four years, and that the claimed cause of
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action accrued when the Bank failed to disburse funds upon SBA
approval.

(R-491, 491a, 492 (Order dated July 9, 1992)).

The

statute of limitations for promissory estoppel is indeed four years
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.

Like the claim of economic

duress, since there is no specific statutory period stated, it is
covered by the four-year catch-all provision of Utah Code Ann. §
78-12-25. Once again, the claim was not asserted until five years
and nine months after the alleged breach. The trial court's ruling
is correct and must be upheld.
Even if the claim of promissory estoppel were not time barred,
the Defendants did not make out a prima

facie

case of promissory

estoppel, as a matter of law. Originally, promissory estoppel was
merely a substitute for consideration in the formation of contracts
generally.

See, e.g., Ravarino

570 (1953) .

v.

Price,

123 Utah 559, 260 P.2d.

The doctrine has been expanded, however, to allow

recovery in situations where at least two essential elements are
present: (1) A definite promise made to another party; and (2)
action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on
the part of the promisee.

Id,

at 575. The Defendants promissory

estoppel claim fails, as a matter of law, because neither of these
two essential elements are present.
1.

THERE WAS NO PROMISE.

The first essential element of promissory estoppel is a
promise. Irwin

Concrete,

Inc.,

v. Sun Coast Properties,

P.2d 1331, 1337 (Wash. App. 1982); See,
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Ravelo

by Ravelo

Inc.,
v.

653
Hawaii

County,

658 P.2d 883 (Hawaii 1983).

Company

v.

Bogard,

In Security

Bank

and

Trust

494 N.E.2d 965 (Ind. App. 1986) (Exhibit D in

Addendum), on facts almost identical to these, the court denied the
plaintiff's promissory estoppel claims, as a matter of law, because
there was no promise.

The Court stated:

We need not consider the last three of these elements
[the elements of promissory estoppel] because
Bogardfs
argument is fatally flawed on the first element—the
existence of a promise.
Id.

at 968.
In order for a promise to be enforceable under the doctrine of

promissory estoppel it must be clear and unambiguous. The terms of
the promise must be certain, as there can be no promissory estoppel
without a real promise.
preliminary

negotiations

Promissory estoppel cannot be based on
and

discussions

or

Keil

Glacier

negotiate the terms of a contract.

v.

an

agreement
Park

Inc.,

to
614

P.2d 502 (Mont. 1980).
In the instant case, by the Defendants' own admission, the
Bank never made a promise as to when, or even if, the loan would
ultimately be granted.
387)).

(R-1954-1955

(Kehl Deposition, pp. 386-

The exact conversations which took place between the Bank

and the Defendants are set forth in detail under Point IA.2.,
above.

None of the statements which the Defendants claim were made

by bank officers amount to a promise sufficiently unequivocal and
definite to sustain a claim for promissory estoppel.

29

B.

THERE WAS NO DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE BY THE DEFENDANTS.

Conceptionally, the heart of a claim for promissory estoppel
is detrimental reliance by the promisee.
The case Ravarino

v.

Price,

supra,

contains a thorough and

intelligent discussion of the element of detrimental reliance in
the context of promissory estoppel. In holding that the conduct in
that case was insufficient, as a matter of law, the Supreme Court
stated that in order for reliance to be sufficient it must be in a
situation where the promise was designed to and did in fact induce
significant change of position by the promisee.
See also,

Southeastern

Equipment

Co. v.

Mauss,

Id.

at 575, 576.

696 P. 2d 1187 (Utah

1985) (holding that there could be no promissory estoppel where the
party claiming it had not changed position to their detriment in
reliance on the promise).
Other courts have also stressed the importance of the element
of detrimental reliance.
App. 19990)
promissory

Lucero

v. Goldberg,

804 P.2d 206 (Colo.

(stating that an order to rise to the level of
estoppel

there

must

be

a

tangible

act

or

a

relinquishment of some significant right in reliance on promise);
Gilbert

v. City

of Caldwell,

732 P. 2d 355 (Ida. App. 1987) (holding

that the detriment suffered in reliance on the alleged promise must
be substantial in an economic sense).
In the instant case, Defendants have not cited any evidence in
the record to establish their reliance on the alleged promise.
They did not change position, and they did not waive any rights or
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claims which they previously had.

They did gather information,

obtain an appraisal and make general preparations, but this is done
in every loan and hardly rises to the level of reliance required.
And, it was all done before the Defendants claim there was a
commitment. The trial court's dismissal of the promissory estoppel
claim was proper both in statute of limitations grounds, and on the
merits.
D.

Fourth Cause of Action, Negligence.

In their fourth cause of action, the Defendants claim that
State Bank was negligent

in the structuring, processing and

disbursal of each of the October 1987 loan and the February 1987
loan.

The trial court found that the statute of limitations for

negligence is four years under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §
78-12-25.

(R-0493 (Order dated July 9, 1992)).

The Utah Supreme

Court has repeatedly held that the statute of limitations for
negligence
Bonneville

is four years.
Inv.,

Inc.,

Davidson

Lumber

Sales,

Inc.,

v.

794 P.2d 11 (Utah 1990). Therefore, the

court found that as to the loans of October 7, 1985, and February
10,

1987, the claims of negligence were time barred.

The

Defendants did not claim negligence in relation to the November 7,
1988 loan and none is argued in the Brief of Appellants before this
Court (R-1191 (Reporter's Hearing Transcript, June 24, 1992)).
Thus, without question, the trial court's dismissal of the fourth
cause of action for negligence was proper.
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E. Fifth Cause of Action, Control and Self Dealing, and Sixth
Cause of Action, Breach of Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing.
The fifth and sixth causes of action of the Defendants'
counterclaim will be addressed together since they are addressed
together in the Defendants' Brief and since the issues in relation
to them are essentially the same.

In their Brief, the Defendants

allege four separate facts which they claim give rise to the claims
of control and self dealing, and breach of duties of good faith and
fair dealing.

First, they state that the Bank admitted that the

$60,000 loan was to resolve the funding problem created by State
Bank in connection with the $325,000 loan.
incorrect.

This is absolutely

There is no citation to the record which accompanies

the allegation, and there is certainly no proof in the record where
State Bank admitted that the $60,000 loan was given to resolve the
alleged delay in funding.

Conclusory statements without citation

to the record will not be considered by the Court.
Park City,

Marchant

v.

111 P.2d 677, 682 (Utah App. 1989).

Secondly, the Defendants state that "State Bank materially
changed the terms of the original loan documents."
Brief at 26.)

(Appellants'

This statement implies that the documents were

changed after they were signed.

This is incorrect, at best.

In

his deposition, Michael Kehl admitted that the Defendants did not
claim that the documents had been altered after signature.
1925-1928 (Kehl Depos. pp. 356-360)).

(R-

The only allegation in

relation to the November 7, 1988, loan, is that State Bank prepared
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the documents with Troy Hygro as the borrower and Keith and Karen
Sue Kehl as guarantors, instead

of vice versa.

Also, the

Appellants allege that State Bank should not have insisted that
Keith and Karen Sue Kehl guaranty the earlier loans as a condition
to making the third loan.

record

on these

two

Once again, there

is

no proof

in

the

allegations.

Defendants claim that these things alone constitute an issue
of fact as to State Bank's self dealing and breaches of duty of
good faith.

The trial court found as a matter of law that these

claims did not rise to the level of improper control or a breach of
good faith.

(R-0494 (Order dated July 9, 1992)).

Certainly the

Bank has the right to insist on a guaranty from anyone it chooses.
There is absolutely no proof in the record that State Bank exerted
any improper pressure upon Keith Kehl and Karen Sue Kehl to
guaranty the prior loans as a condition to granting the third loan.
As to the claims that the guarantor and borrower are reversed on
the loan documents for the November 7, 1988 loan, the documents
were signed as is (R-507-509 (Third Fife Affid.,flfl26-31)) and
thus any claimed agreement that is inconsistent with the written
documents is barred as a matter of contract law by the parol
evidence rule. See generally, Union Bank v. Swenson,
(Utah 1985).

707 P.2d 663

And, even if the claims weren't barred by the parol

evidence rule, it makes no difference whether the parties are
guarantors or principal obligors since they are both liable anyway.
The findings of the trial court on this issue must be upheld.
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Defendants next claim that there is an issue of fact as to
whether a special or fiduciary relationship was developed between
the Bank and the Defendants.

(Brief of Appellants, pp. 27-28.)

The Defendants' Brief states two alleged facts in support of the
claimed fiduciary relationship.

First, the Defendants claim that

"Troy relied totally on the Bank's creative financing ideas to
remedy the situation."
"there

is evidence

proceeds

(Brief of Appellants at 28).

that the Bank paid

of the November

represented

7,

1988

itself

first

loan, contrary

Second,
from

the

to what was

to the SBA and without full disclosure to Troy."

(Brief of Appellants at 28) .

Both of these "facts" are alleged

without reference to the record.

State Bank has no idea what the

basis of these alleged facts are, and is at a loss as to how to
respond to the unsubstantiated claims.
requires citation to the record.

Utah R. App. P. 24(e)

Defendants have not done so,

Plaintiff is not aware of any facts in the record to substantiate
the Defendants' claims, and they should not be allowed to rely on
them.

Arguments without

considered.

Marchant

v.

citation to the record

Park

City,

supra,

will

not be

at 682.

However, even if the facts as stated are true, they certainly
do not give rise to a fiduciary relationship.

Ordinarily, no

fiduciary nor confidential relationship exists between a bank and
its borrower.

Pulse

1105 (Mont. 1985); First

v.

North

American

National

1055 (Colo. App. 1990); First

Land

title

Bank of Meeker

Bank
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of Wakeeney

v.
v.

Co.,

707 P. 2d

Theos,

794 P.2d

Moden,

681 P.2d

11, 13 (Kan. 1984) . The Utah Supreme Court has imposed a difficult
standard for finding a fiduciary relationship, stating that the
involvement must be so drastic that the dependent party is unable
to substitute his will for the party providing the guidance.
Hake v. Thomas,

Von

705 P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 1985).

Many cases have held, on facts involving a much greater
relationship than those alleged in this case, that there is no
confidential or fiduciary relationship between a bank and its
borrower.

Pulse

v. North

America

Land Title

Company,

707 P.2d 1105

(Mont. 1985) (finding no fiduciary relationship notwithstanding
that the customer had had accounts with the bank for approximately
3 6 years, dealt with the loan department on a few occasions prior
to the transaction in question, financed the purchase of their
residence and a business with the bank, and had a few small loans
insured by the Small Business Administration through that bank);
First

National

(finding

no

Bank of Meeker

confidential

v. Theos,

794 P. 2d (Colo. App. 1990)

relationship

notwithstanding

the

customer7s claim that he reposed a special trust and confidence in
the bank as a result of 20 years of prior dealings, plus a longstanding social relationship with the bank officer and receiving
advice from the officer over the years); Von Hake v.
P. 2d

766

(Utah

1985)

(finding

as a matter

of

Thomas,
law

705

that no

confidential relationship existed even though the customer was 82
years old and distressed over the imminent sale of the ranch he had
owned for 40 years).
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The meager facts presented by the Defendants, which are not
substantiated by the record, do not rise to the level of a
fiduciary relationship as a matter of law.
Finally, Defendants claim that State Bank was in a fiduciary
relationship with Troy Hygro because it is the trustee on the Deeds
of Trust securing the loans.
reasons.

This theory is flawed for two

First of all, Defendants cite no authority which would

obligate a trustee under a trust deed to a fiduciary obligation in
its general dealings with the borrower. State Bank has been unable
to find any Utah cases which even address such a proposition.
Secondly, even if such a fiduciary relationship exists, the claims
which the Defendants assert do not relate in any way to the trust
deeds.

They relate to other general dealings between the parties

and not to the specific property or loans which the Defendants
claim were improper.
POINT II
THE DEFENDANTS HAVE FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE RULING
OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS IN ERROR AND THUS THE RULING OF
THE TRIAL COURT MUST BE UPHELD
The main argument made by the Defendants on appeal is that the
trial court improperly ruled that the statute of limitations barred
their affirmative defenses. Because the Defendants' arguments are
not specific, their Brief gives the impression that all of the
counterclaims were also raised as affirmative defenses.

In

reality, the Defendants only raised four claims in opposition to
State Bank's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
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(R-0666-0675

(Appellants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment)).
fund

the

$325,000 when

The four claims are: (1) failure to

processed;

(2) economic

duress;

(3)

negligent structuring and disbursal; and (4) breach of duties of
good faith and fair dealing and control and self dealing.

Of the

four claims, two were not plead as affirmative defenses and should
not be considered as such. Each will be discussed in detail below.
Defendants

have

completely

failed

to point

to

specific

evidence in the record that raises a material issue of fact as to
any of their affirmative defenses.

Instead, Defendants have

deceptively combined all of the court's numerous rulings into one
argument which focuses entirely on their view of the law, while
brushing

aside

the

facts.

Defendants'

shotgun

approach

inaccurately portrays the trial court's October 9, 1992 ruling
(which addressed the affirmative defenses) as one that hinged
completely on the court's supposed finding that all of Defendants'
defenses were barred by the statute of limitations.

In doing so,

Defendants have selectively chosen not to discuss the full factual
basis for the court's ruling.

And, as to the poorly supported

facts which they state in their Brief, they fail to show how they
are material. The Appellants have the duty to marshall the facts,
and show the error of the trial court's ruling.
City,

supra,

at 682.

Marchant

v. Park

The Defendants have not done so and the

dismissal of their affirmative defenses must be upheld.
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POINT III
ALL DEFENSES RELATING TO THE 1985 LOAN AND THE 1987 LOAN WERE
PROPERLY BARRED
The first and third arguments asserted by the Defendants in
their Memorandum regarding the affirmative defenses duplicate the
arguments made in the counterclaim that State Bank breached a
contract to fund the $325,000 loan when SBA approval was granted,
and that it negligently and improperly structured and disbursed the
two loans.

First of all, these two claims were never plead as

affirmative defenses and thus should not even be considered. Utah
R. Civ. P. 8 requires that all affirmative defenses be raised in
the pleadings. Defendants have never sought to amend their answer
to assert these claims as affirmative defenses, and they should not
be permitted to do so on appeal.

See Girard

v. Appleby,

660 P.2d

245, 248 (Utah 1983) (Rule 15, permitting amendment of pleading, to
be applied with less liberality when amendments are proposed during
or after trial, rather than before trial).
However, even if this Court chooses to consider these claims
as if they had been properly raised as affirmative defenses, the
trial court's order granting judgment to State Bank over the
affirmative defenses must be upheld, both because the claims are
barred by the statute of limitations and because the Appellants
have not established a prima

facie

case as a matter of law.

Even though it may be true that statutes of limitation
generally do not apply to defenses raised by a party, it is not
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true that all so-called

"defenses" are equally shielded from

applicable statutes of limitation.

There are many instances when

"defenses" are or should be dismissed because the basis for the
claim is barred by a statute of limitation.
In this case, once the trial court determined that Defendants'
claims relating to the October 1985 loan and the February 1987 loan
were barred by the statute of limitations (discussed in detail
above under Point I), it properly refused to consider any of those
claims to be viable defenses to Plaintiff's Complaint. The general
rules cited by Defendants regarding the application of statutes of
limitation to defenses are inapplicable in this case.
A.

Claims Barred by Statutes of Limitation Cannot be Brought
as a Direct Action or as a Defense Under Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-12-44.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44 expressly precludes the use of
claims that are barred by the statute of limitations as affirmative
defenses.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44 (1992) states:

In any case founded on contract, when any part of the
principal or interest shall have been paid, or an
acknowledgment of an existing liability, debt or claim,
or any promise to pay the same, shall have been made, an
action may be brought within the period prescribed for
the same after such payment, acknowledgment or promise;
but such acknowledgment or promise must be in writing,
signed by the party to be charged thereby. When a right

of action is barred by the provisions of any statute,
shall be unavailable
either as a cause of action
ground

of defense.

it
or

(Emphasis added).

The Utah Supreme Court construed the last sentence of § 78-1244 as follows: "[A] reasonable interpretation of the last sentence
of this statute would compel the conclusion that any statute which
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bars a right of action is conclusive unless its operation is
suspended by the specific provisions of § 78-12-44." Yergensen
Ford,

v.

16 Utah 2d 397, 402 P.2d 696, 697 (1965) (emphasis added).
According to the plain language of the last sentence of § 78-

12-44 and the yergrensen court's interpretation, this statute is
squarely controlling.

The trial court's ruling on the statute of

limitations issues is conclusive because in this case none of the
provisions of § 78-12-44 suspended the operation of the statute of
limitations.

Defendants' claims are barred by the statutes of

limitation, and thus are unavailable either as a cause of action or
ground of defense.
Defendants incorrectly assume, without authority, that § 7812-44 was enacted only to cover situations involving the effect of
acknowledgments of liability or part payment on the tolling of the
statutes of limitation.

As the Yergensen

court made clear, the

provisions of the last sentence are applicable in all cases in
which a statute bars a right of action unless
of the section suspend such an effect.

the other provisions
In this case, no such

suspension took place, meaning the trial court's ruling remained
conclusive.
Defendants also inaccurately argue that their defenses were
barred wholly because of the court's reliance on § 78-12-44. While
it is true that Plaintiff argued that such should be the case, the
court never affirmatively based its ruling on § 78-12-44. Rather,
as was previously noted, the trial court concluded that summary
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judgment was justified as to Plaintiff's first and second claims
for relief because "no material issues [existed] with respect to
the October 7, 1985 transaction."

(R-699 (November 13, 1992 Order,

f 1)). Even if the trial court would have relied solely on § 7812-44 in dismissing all of Defendants7 claims and defenses relating
to the 1985 transaction, the court's decision would have been well
grounded in the law.
B.

The Alleged Breach of the Commitment to Fund the October
1985 Loan Did Not Grow Out of the Transaction or
Occurrence Sued Upon.

A defense is only shielded from the effects of a statute of
limitations when the defense "arises out of the transaction sued
Allis-Chalmers

upon."

v.

North

Bonneville,

775 P.2d

953, 955

(Wash. 1989). In delineating the circumstances under which a cause
of action should be considered to "arise out of" or "grow out of"
a transaction or occurrence, the Utah Supreme Court has declared
that "a cause of action is founded upon an instrument in writing
when the contract, obligation, or liability grows out of the
written instrument, not remotely or ultimately, but
Evans

v.

Pickett

Bros.

Farms,

(1972) (emphasis added).

immediately."

17 Utah 2d 375, 499 P. 2d 273, 274

Similarly, the Court has stated:

"xBut the cause of action is not upon a contract founded upon
an instrument in writing, within the meaning of the Code,
merely because it is in some way remotely or indirectly
connected with such an instrument, or because the instrument
would be a link in the chain of evidence establishing the

cause of action. In order to be founded upon an instrument in
writing,
the instrument must itself
contain a contract to do
the thing for the nonperformance of which the action
is
brought.'"
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Petty

& Riddle

v.

(quoting Patterson
Applying

Lunt,
v.

104 Utah 130, 138 P.2d 648, 651 (1942)

Doe,

62 P. 569, 570 (Cal. 1900)).

the foregoing principals

to the present action,

Defendants' defenses clearly do not arise immediately out of the
loan transactions that form the basis for Plaintiff's claims and,
therefore, are subject to the applicable statute of limitations.
The loan documents contain no provision requiring Plaintiffs to
fund the $325,000 loan when SBA approval was granted.
The trial court properly concluded that the October 7, 1985
loan documents and the alleged oral contract were

independent

agreements when it dismissed Defendants' counterclaims.
492

(July 9,

1992 Order)).

Defendants were actually

(R-491aseeking

affirmative relief for alleged harms arising out of a separate and
independent oral contract; that is, an alleged contract to make a
loan at a specific

time.

All

counterclaims

relating

to the

separate alleged agreement were properly barred as defenses by the
statute of limitations applicable to oral contracts.
It

would

take

a

considerable

stretch

to

conclude

that

Defendants' claims arose out of the loan agreement. Nothing in the
written agreement confirms or gives effect to the oral dealings of
the parties. There is clearly no merger of the two separate causes
of action and the issues surrounding the alleged oral contract are
immaterial to the validity of Plaintiff's Complaint.
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C.

Each of Defendants' claims Barred by the Statute of
Limitations Was in Reality an Set Off, Not a Matter of
"Pure Defense."

Courts universally recognize that "in the absence of a statute
to the contrary, a demand pleaded by way of setoff, counterclaim or
cross-claim

is

regarded

as

an

affirmative

action

in

most

jurisdictions, and therefore, unlike a matter of pure defense, is
subject to the operation of the statute of limitations."
American

1965);

Ins.

co.

v. Cassel

see also Franciso

1948); Jewell

v. Compton,

Truck

Lines,

Rochester

402 P.2d 782, 786 (Kan.

v. Francisco,

191 P.2d 317, 320 (Mont.

559 P.2d 874, 875-76 (Oregon 1977). "Set

off" or "counterclaim" are defined as "a demand which the defendant
has against the plaintiff arising out of a transaction extrinsic to
the plaintiff's cause of action. . . . "
Co.,

Inc.,

part

on other

Morris

v.

Achen

Const*

747 P.2d 1206, 1209 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) reversed

Law Dictionary

grounds,

747 P.2d 1211 (Ariz. 1986) (citing

in

Blackfs

1146 (5th ed. 1979)).

Furthermore, according to the Utah Supreme Court, "[a]t law a
party cannot use a matter as a set-off unless it is a legally
subsisting cause of action in his favor and upon which he could
maintain an independent action." Reeve v. Blatchley,
147 P.2d 861, 864 (1944).

106 Utah 259,

Similarly, in Arizona, if the defendant

is not entitled to obtain relief in a direct action, the defendant
cannot assert setoff or counterclaim.
Connor,

Occidental

604 P.2d 605, 607 (Ariz. 1979).
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Chemical

Co.

v.

In this case, each of Defendants' counterclaims and related
affirmative defenses is offensive in nature rather than purely
defensive.

The Defendants are unquestionably seeking affirmative

relief for their claims.

The trial court, as a consequence,

correctly treated Defendants' claims as set offs barred by the
statute of limitations rather than pure defenses shielded from
statute of limitations.

Under Reeve,

Defendants are not entitled

to claim set offs when there is no legally subsisting cause of
action to support their claims.

Regardless of what Defendants

attempt to label their claims, the claims are in reality set offs
and as such were appropriately barred by the trial court on statute
of limitations grounds.

In discussing this exact issue, the

Supreme Court of Hawaii stated:
The proper standard to determine the relevant limitation
period is the nature of the claim or right,
not the form
of the
pleading.
Au v. Au, supra,

at 177 (emphasis added).

The Defendants' reliance on Seattle
v. Siebol,

First

National

Bank,

N.A.

824 P.2d 1252 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) for the notion that

their counterclaims should have been treated as defenses, not
subject to statutes of limitation, is unfounded.
Siebol
Siebol

The facts in

and in the present case are easily distinguishable.

In

the defendant explicitly asserted as a counterclaim that the

bank breached an oral contract to loan him a specified amount of
money. Id.

at 1254. At the same time he asserted the breach as an

affirmative defense.

Id.
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The trial court in Siebol

concluded that the counterclaim was

barred by the statute of limitations, but granted a setoff on the
affirmative defense for lost profits on a theory of promissory
estoppel.

Id.

After hearing testimony on the matter, the trial

court specifically found that the plaintiff bank represented to
defendant that he could obtain loans for a specified amount and
that the defendant had relied on the plaintiff's assurances in
opening

a business.

Id.

The court of appeals affirmed

the

decision noting that some defenses are not barred by the statute of
limitations as long as the defense arises out of the transaction
sued upon, goes to the justice of the plaintiff's claim, and the
main action itself is timely.

Id.

at 1255.

The appeals court was

convinced that there was substantial evidence to support the trial
court's finding that equitable offset was warranted based on the
principles of promissory estoppel.

Id.

In the present case, unlike Siebol,

at 1256.
there is no factual basis

in the record to support a finding that any of Defendants' defenses
are supported by substantial evidence. As was previously discussed
under Point I, the alleged promises by State Bank were not clear
and

unambiguous

as

is required

and

there

was

no

detrimental

reliance by defendants. Further, Defendants' defenses do not arise
out of the transaction sued upon. The promises made in Siebol

were

an integral part of the loan agreement between the parties which is
not the case here.

Finally, Defendants, unlike the defendant in
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Siebol,

did not raise their claims relating to the alleged oral

promises as both affirmative defenses and counterclaims.
Defendants further reliance on Jacobsen

v.

Bunker,

699 P.2d

1208. 1210 (Utah 1985), for the proposition that a counterclaim can
be

set-off

defendant's
likewise

against
claim

the

plaintiff's

is barred

inapplicable

by

a

claim

statute

in this action.

even
of

though

limitations,

Jacobsen

involved

the
is
two

sisters who each borrowed money from their father on promissory
notes and who inherited shares of the balance remaining on each
note after their father's death.

The plaintiff brought an action

against the defendant to recover the amount due.

The defendant

counterclaimed for the amount due on plaintiff's note.
1209.

Id.

at

Because the notes were executed and payable in California,

California law governed the outcome of the case. Id.

Yet, because

no California law existed on the matter, the court presumed the
California law was the same as Utah's.

Id.

The Supreme Court concluded that even though the defendants'
counterclaim was barred by the statute of limitations, defendant
could still offset against the amount owed the plaintiff.
1210.

Id.

at

The court relied upon Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 13 (i) to

support its conclusion.

Rule 13 (i) provides:

When cross demands have existed between persons under
such circumstances that, if one had brought an action
against the other, a counterclaim could have been set up,
the two demands shall be deemed compensated so far as
they equal each other, and neither can be deprived of the
benefit thereof by the assignment or death of the other,
except as provided in Subdivision (j) of this rule.
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The Utah Supreme Court in Salt
Utah

607, 17

P.2d

Lake City

281, 285

v.

Telluride

Power Co.,

(1932) , interpreted

Rule

82

13(i)'s

predecessor (Section 6578, Comp. Laws Utah 1917, which is identical
to the present version in all material respects).

Telluride

The

court emphasized that in order for Rule 17 (i) to apply the two
claims must be "coexistent and overlapping in point of time" or
rather that both must be "subsisting claims before the statute of
limitations has run against the other."
1932); see

also

Stewart

Livestock

Co.

v.

17 P. 2d 281, 285 (Utah
Ostler,

99 Utah 240, 144

P.2d 276, 284 (1943).
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that in this case Rule
13 (i) is inapplicable to the October 1985 loan. Defendants' claims
against Plaintiff for its alleged failure to timely loan Defendants
the $325,000 did not "coexist or overlap" with Plaintiff's claims.
before

Defendants' claims were barred by the statute of limitations
Defendants' breached the repayment obligation under the loan.

The

statute of limitations for the alleged failure to fund the $325,000
loan expired on September 3, 1989.

The Defendants didn't default

under the $325,000 loan until February of 1990 (R-503 (third Fife
Affid., f 12)).
In addition to the foregoing, Rule

13 (i) should

also be

construed to require that the defendants' claim must arise out of
the

transaction

or

occurrence

that

forms

the

basis

of

the

plaintiff's claim before a defendant can offset one claim against
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a plaintiff's co-existing claim.

Such requirement would wisely

prevent defendants from being able to obtain offsets regardless of
whether the counterclaim has long been barred by the statute of
limitations or has any connection whatsoever with the plaintiff's
claims for relief. See Lightcap

v. Mobil Oil Corp.,

562 P.2d 1, 13

(Kan. 1977) (noting that "an outlawed claim may be used as a setoff
if it (a) coexisted with the plaintiff's claim and (b) arises out
of the xcontract or transaction' on which the plaintiff's claim is
based.")-1
D.

The Defendants have not made a prima facie
Affirmative Defenses.

case on these

Beyond the statute of limitations arguments, Appellants still
have to prove a prima facie
Henry Jones

Co. v. Smith,

case to get past summary judgment.

J.

27 Utah 2d 225, 494 P.2d 526, 527 (1972)

(defendant's claims of offset against stated purchase price were
affirmative defenses upon which he has the burden of proof).

The

merits of these affirmative defenses are identical to their
counterparts in the counterclaims and are discussed in detail under
Point I, above.

Whether as a counterclaim or as an affirmative

defense, Appellants failed to prove their prima

facie

case at the

trial court and the affirmative defenses must be overruled, as a

1

At one time, Utah and Kansas had essentially identical rules relating to co-existing claims.
See Telluride Power Co., 17 P.2d at 285. Kansas eventually amended its rule to explicitly
include a requirement that the outlawed claim coexisted with the plaintiffs claim and arose out
the contract that formed the basis of the plaintiffs claim. Though Utah's Rule does not contain
the express language Kansas's rule does, its should be construed as though it does.
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matter of law, notwithstanding the statute of limitations issues.
Because space is short, and because the issues are identical,
Respondent will not repeat all of the argument and analysis on the
failure of the Defendants to prove a prima

facie

case, but rather

incorporates herein by reference the arguments set forth under
Point I, above.
POINT IV
THE CLAIMS FOR ECONOMIC DURESS AND BREACH OF DUTIES OF
GOOD FAITH, FAIR DEALING AND FIDUCIARY DUTY WERE DECIDED
ON THE MERITS BY THE TRIAL COURT, AND THE APPELLANTS DID
NOT MAKE THEIR CASE AS A MATTER OF LAW
Because the Appellants' Brief is not issue specific, it gives
the impression that all of the affirmative defenses were denied
based on the statute of limitations.

This is not the case.

The

second and fourth affirmative defenses argued by the Appellants in
opposition to State Bank's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
those being economic duress and the alleged breach of duties of
good

faith,

fair

dealing

and

fiduciary

responsibility,

were

dismissed on the merits.
According to the trial court's July 9, 1992 Order, each of the
corresponding claims in the Counterclaim was dismissed by the court
on the merits because Defendants' failed to submit sufficient proof
to sustain their claim.
Similarly,

(R-0490-0495 (July 9, 1992 Order)).

in considering

the

same

issues

as

affirmative

defenses, the trial court properly concluded, after hearing and
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reviewing the factual record before it, that the Appellants had not
met their burden of proof:
I really don't — you know, the same reasons that I ruled on
the merits on the counterclaim I think are going to
be
applicable on the merits. At least some of those matters.
The fair dealing, good faith and so forth, as defenses. And
of course partial summary judgment can be granted with respect
to a defense, either allowing it or excluding it. And I
don't

really see factual bases for those things anymore as a defense
as I saw as an independent cause of action.
(R-1262 (October 9, 1992 Hearing, p. 68, emphasis added)).

Once again, because space is short, the merits of these two
claims will not be repeated here.
were in the counterclaims.

The issues are the same as they

The trial court ruled the same way, and

this Court should uphold the trial court's ruling on these issues
as

affirmative

defenses

just

as

it

should

on

the

issues

as

counterclaims.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, State Bank respectfully requests
that the decisions of the trial court be affirmed.

State Bank

should also be awarded costs and/or attorney's fees pursuant to
Utah R. App. P. 3 3.
DATED this

day of December, 1993.
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE

THOMAS M. HIGBEE
Attorneys for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the *%/)

day of December, 1993, two

true and correct copies of the within and foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLEE were mailed, first-class postage prepaid, to Budge W.
Call, BROWN & BROWN, Attorney for Defendants, 505 East 200 South,
Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102.
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE BANK OF SOUTHERN UTAH,
a Utah Banking Corporation,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

vs.
TROY HYGRO SYSTEMS, INC.,
MICHAEL R. KEHL, GLORIA F.
KEHL, DONALD K. KEHL,
LENORE F. KEHL, KEITH KEHL,
KAREN SUE KEHL and
JOHN DOES 1 through 10,
Defendants.

Civil No. 900901153
Judge Robert F. Owens

TROY HYGRO SYSTEMS, INC.,
MICHAEL R. KEHL, GLORIA F.
KEHL, LENORE F. KEHL, KEITH
KEHL and KAREN SUE KEHL,
Counterclaimants,
vs.

0004SU

STATE BANK OF SOUTHERN UTAH, )
a Utah Banking Corporation,
)
)

Counterclaim Defendant.

)

This matter came before the Court on Wednesday, June 24, 1992, on the Plaintiffs
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to the Counterclaim of the Defendants. The matter
was heard by the Honorable Robert F. Owens, District Court Judge by assignment. The
Plaintiff appeared by and through its attorney of record, Thomas M. Higbee, and the firm of
Chamberlain & Higbee. The Defendants appeared by and through their attorney of record,
Budge W. Call, BROWN & BROWN. The Court listened to the arguments of counsel, and
reviewed the affidavits and discovery. Being fully advised in the premises; now therefore the
Court enters its
FINDINGS
1.

On or about October 7, 1985, State Bank of Southern Utah, a Utah banking

corporation, granted a loan to Troy Hygro Systems, Inc., guaranteed by the other Defendants,
in the amount of $325,000.
2. The Defendants have alleged breaches in connection with the above-referenced loan.
Specifically, the Defendants allege that State Bank failed to timely and properly grant the loan
pursuant to a prior agreement to do so.
3. The alleged breaches occurred on or about September 3, 1985, when the approval by
the Small Business Administration was given to State Bank and State Bank did not advance the
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funds. The statute of limitations for all claims relating to the Bank's failure to timely and
properly grant the loan and disburse the funds accrued on September 3, 1985.
4. The alleged breach of agreement to grant the $325,000 loan upon SBA approval, and
all other claims relating to the $325,000 loan, are not founded on an instrument in writing.
5. The actual loan granted October 7, 1985, is independent of the alleged obligation to
grant a loan or to perform in any other way, prior to that date. Thus, the documents relating
to the October 7, 1985, loan do not constitute a writing sufficient to satisfy the statute of
limitations as to anything that happened prior thereto.

There is no merger of the two

independent contracts.
6. The transactions regarding the $325,000 loan, and the alleged breaches in connection
therewith, are independent of the subsequent loans and dealings between the same parties.
Therefore, nothing that happened after the alleged breaches relating to the $325,000 loan in
October of 1985 could extend the accrual date for the statute of limitations relating thereto, and
attempts to include these transactions with later transactions for the purposes of determining the
commencement of the statute of limitations are not within the law.
7. There is no unequivocal reaffirmation or repromise by State Bank subsequent to the
alleged breaches in relation to the $325,000 loan. And, the Court finds that the doctrine of
reaffirmation as relied on by the Defendants applies only to contracts for the payment of money
or other liquidated obligations and thus is not applicable to the claims in this case.

3

8. On or about February 10, 1987, State Bank granted an additional loan to Troy Hygro,
and the other Defendants as guarantors, in the amount of $60,000. The funds were fully
disbursed on or before February 20, 1987.
9. There is an issue of fact as to whether State Bank properly disbursed the funds from
the February 10, 1987, loan, in the amount of $60,000.
10. The claim regarding the failure of State Bank to properly disburse the funds from
the February 10, 1987, loan, is founded upon an instrument in writing since it involves the issue
of performance of the loan and obligations associated therewith, which are written.
11. Therefore, the six-year statute of limitations regarding contracts founded upon
instruments in writing applies to the breach of contract claim for the alleged failure to properly
disburse the funds in connection with the February 10, 1987, loan.
12. The claims for negligence, also relating to the disbursal of the February 10, 1987
loan, are governed by the four-year statute of limitations applicable to negligence claims. The
breach accrued on or before February 20, 1987, when the funds were fiilly disbursed. The
applicable four-year statute of limitation regarding the negligence claims began running on that
date.
13. The Defendants' claims for breach of duty of good faith, and unauthorized control
over the affairs of Troy Hygro, consist of three distinct and separate transactions, each related
to the three loans at issue herein. The three loans are the $325,000 loan granted on October 7,
1985, the $60,000 loan granted on February 10, 1987, and a loan in the amount of $49,000
granted on or about November 9, 1988.
4
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14. As to each separate claim for breach of duty of good faith and unauthorized control,
the causes of action accrue, and the statute of limitations begins to run, when the action was
allegedly taken by the Bank and the alleged damage occurred. In each case, as relating to the
three separate transactions here, the statute of limitations began to run when the respective loans
were given. These claims for breach of duty of good faith and unauthorized control are
governed by the applicable four-year statute of limitations.
15. The claims for breach of duty of good faith, and improper control, are barred by
the four-year statute of limitations as to the transactions relating to the October 1985 loan and
the February 1987 loan, and the transactions associated therewith; The breaches of good faith
and improper control are not barred by the statute of limitations for the loan of November, 1988,
and the transactions associated therewith.
16. However, the Defendants have not submitted sufficient proof to support a legal
theory relating to the claims of improper control and breach of duty of good faith. The claims
relating to improper control and breach of duty of good faith should therefore be dismissed, with
prejudice, except that the dismissal shall be without prejudice insofar as it relates to the
obligations of Keith Kehl, and the issue whether he was misled by Plaintiff to his damage in the
papers he signed.
17. The Defendants have also not submitted sufficient proof to sustain their claim for
economic duress, as a matter of law, and all economic duress claims should therefore be
dismissed.
18. The Seventh Cause of Action should be dismissed upon stipulation of the parties.
5
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The Court having entered its Findings;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that State Bank's Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment is hereby granted in part and denied in part as follows:
1. The Defendants' First Cause of Action should be and hereby is dismissed, with
prejudice and on the merits, except for the Defendants' contract claims for wrongful
disbursement of the February 10, 1987 loan in breach of the written contract, which are not
dismissed.
2. The Defendants' Second Cause of Action should be and hereby is dismissed, with
prejudice and on the merits, in its entirety.
3. The Defendants' Third Cause of Action should be and hereby is dismissed, with
prejudice and on the merits, in its entirety.
4. The Defendants' Fourth Cause of Action should be and hereby is dismissed, with
prejudice and on the merits, in its entirety.
5. The Defendants' Fifth Cause of Action should be and hereby is dismissed, with
prejudice and on the merits, in its entirety; provided, however, that insofar as it relates to the
liability of Keith Kehl, and the issue whether he was misled by the Plaintiff to his damage in the
papers he signed, the dismissal is without prejudice.
6. The Defendants' Sixth Cause of Action should be and hereby is dismissed, with
prejudice and on the merits, in its entirety.

6
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7. The Defendants' Seventh Cause of Action should be and hereby is dismissed, with
prejudice and on the merits.
DATED this

/

day of July, 1992.

lOBERT F. OWMS
District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

day of July, 1992, a true and correct copy of the

within and foregoing ORDER was mailed, first-class postage prepaid, to Budge W. Call,
BROWN & BROWN, Attorney for Defendants, 505 East 200 South, Suite 400, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84102.

Secretary A
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE BANK OF SOUTHERN UTAH
a Utah Banking Corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
TROY HYGRO SYSTEMS, INC.;
MICHAEL R, KEHL; GLORIA F. KEHL
LEONORE F. KEHL; KEITH KEHL;
KAREN SUE KEHL AND JOHN DOES
1through 10,

ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
TO PLAINTIFF ON COMPLAINT
CASE NO. 900901153

Defendants

TROY HYGRO SYSTEMS, INC.;
MICHAEL R. KEHL; GLORIA F. KEHL
LENORE F. KEHL; KEITH KEHL;
KAREN SUE KEHL,
Counterclaimants
vs.
STATE BANK OF SOUTHERN UTAH
a Utah Banking Corporation,
Counterclaim
Defendant

1
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the entire
complaint (partial in the sense that issues remained on the
counterclaim) was argued on^and taken under advisement. The
court now rules as follows: \<f)cc ^ IQB2.
1. Consistent with the findings in the previous order filed
July 16, 1992, the court finds no material issues with respect to
the October 7, 1985 transaction and grants summary judgment on
the first and second claims for relief in the complaint, for the
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amounts claimed therein and set forth in plaintiff's motion for
partial summary judgment dated August 13, 1992, except for the
issue of attorney's fees,
2. With respect to claims three and four, summary judgment
is granted to plaintiff on all issues relating to the February
10, 1987 loan except for the issues involving defendant's seventh
defense, improper disbursement of loan funds, which will be
tried, as well as the issue of attorney's fees.
3. Summary judgment is granted to plaintiff on claims five,
six, and seven, except for the issue of attorney's fees,
Dated this

is>
I aJ of Nov
ROBERT F. OWENS", Judge T5y Appointment
Fifth District Court

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the
day of November, 1992, a
true and correct copy of the within and foregoing ORDER GRANTING
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFF ON COMPLAINT was mailed,
first-class postage prepaid to Charles C. Brown, Jeffrey B.
Brown, and Budge W. Call, BROWN & BROWN, Attorneys for Defendants
and Counterclaimants, 505 East 200 South, Ste 400, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84102 AND Thomas Higbee, CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE,
Attorneys for Plaintiff, 250 South Main Street, P.O.Box 726,
Cedar City, Utah 84721-0726. Hand

Delivered

-td bt>th aHbrneys

Cru

the courtroom, Hall of JutHce* HiMldtru?) In Ced&r city

^ drMU.

Deputy Clerk
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Charles C. Brown (1446)
Jeffrey B. Brown (0457)
Budge w. Call (5047)
BROWN & BROWN, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants
and Counterclaimants
City Centre I, Suite 401
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-5656
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE BANK OF SOUTHERN UTAH,
a Utah Banking Corporation,
Plaintiff,
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM
vs.
TROY HYGRO SYSTEMS, INC.;
MICHAEL R. KEHL; GLORIA F. KEHL;
LENORE F. KEHL; KEITH KEHL;
KAREN SUE KEHL and JOHN DOES
1 through 10,
Defendants.
TROY HYGRO SYSTEMS, INC.;
MICHAEL R. KEHL; GLORIA F. KEHL;
LENORE F. KEHL; KEITH KEHL;
KAREN SUE KEHL,

Case Number 90 0901153

Counterclaimants
vs.
STATE BANK OF SOUTHERN UTAH,
a Utah Banking Corporation,
Counterclaim
Defendant.

(RTfMllOOCtfS)
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The defendants hereby answer and otherwise respond to
plaintiff's complaint as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
Plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim against the
defendants upon which the relief can be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE
Defendants respond to the numbered allegations of
plaintiff's complaint as follows:
1.

In answering paragraph 1 of plaintiff's complaint

defendants can neither confirm nor deny the allegations and
therefore deny the same.
2.

In answering paragraph 2 defendants admit that

Troy Hygro Systems, Inc. is a Wisconsin Corporation, but deny the
remaining allegations.
3.

In answering paragraph 3 defendants admit that

Michael R. Kehl, Gloria F. Kehl, Donald K. Kehl, Lenore F. Kehl,
Keith Kehl and Karen Sue Kehl are individuals residing outside
the State of Utah but deny the remaining allegations.
4.

In answering paragraph 4 defendants deny the same.

5.

In answering paragraph 5 defendants admit that

Troy Hygro Systems, Inc. and Donald K. Kehl are owners of real
property located in Utah but deny the remaining allegations.
6.

In answering paragraph 6 defendants deny the same.
2
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7.

In answering paragraphs 7 through 8 defendants

deny the same.
8.

In answering paragraph 9 defendants admit that the

terms and conditions of the alleged Note were modified and assert
that said modifications were to material terms of the Note and
were made subsequent to the execution of any alleged guarantees
of the Note by the defendants, defendants deny the remaining
allegations.
9.

In answering paragraphs 10 through 13 defendants

deny the same.
10.

In answering paragraph 14, defendants incorporate

their answers to paragraphs 1 through 13 above by reference.
11.

In answering paragraphs 15 through 19 defendants

deny the same.
12.

In answering paragraph 20 defendants admit that

this court does not have jurisdiction over property located in
the State of Wisconsin, the defendants deny the remaining
allegations.
13.

In answering paragraphs 21 through 38 defendants

deny the same.
1*4. In answering paragraph 39 defendants admit that
the terms and conditions of the alleged Note were modified and
assert that said modifications were material and subsequent to
3
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the execution of any alleged guarantees on the loan by the
defendants, defendants deny the remaining allegations.
15.

In answering paragraphs 40 through 42 defendants

deny the same.
16.

In answer to paragraph 43, defendant's incorporate

their answers to paragraphs 1 through 42 above by reference.
17.

In answering paragraphs 44 through 69 defendants

deny the same.
18.

In answering paragraph 70, defendants incorporate

their answers to paragraphs 1 through 69 above by reference.
19.

In answering paragraphs 71 through 108 defendants

deny the same.

THIRD DEFENSE
Plaintiff has modified or otherwise materially altered the
alleged Promissory Notes and other loan documents making the same
unenforceable.
FOURTH DEFENSE
To the extent to the alleged Promissory Notes have not been
paid, conditions precedent to any liability of the defendants
have not been met by the plaintiff.

oooioo

FIFTH DEFENSE
The alleged Promissory Notes executed by Defendants were
pursuant to proper release and disbursement of loan proceeds by
plaintiff, any alleged amount owing is a result of plaintiff's
breach of those terms barring plaintiff from further recovery and
foreclosure.
SIXTH DEFENSE
The alleged Promissory Notes and guarantees are void for
lack of/or failure of consideration.

SEVENTH DEFENSE
The defendants did not receive proper disbursement of the
funds by plaintiff under the terms of the Promissory Notes and
other loan documents.
EIGHTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrines of laches,
waives and or estoppel.
NINTH DEFENSE
Subsequent to Defendants1 alleged execution of the
Guarantees, plaintiff materially modified the alleged Notes and
other loan documents thereby releasing the defendants as alleged
guarantors.

5
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TENTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff*s relationship with defendants rose to a fiduciary
relationship, plaintiff breached its fiduciary duty with the
defendants in execution of the Promissory Notes, Security
Agreement, Guarantees and other loan documents.

ELEVENTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff breached its duty to deal with the defendants in
good faith and with fair dealing.

TWELFTH DEFENSE
This court has no jurisdiction to order foreclosure on real
property located in Wisconsin.

THIRTEENTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff is precluded under Utah law from simultaneously
foreclosing an all real and personal property.

FOURTEENTH DEFENSE
Defendants1 alleged execution of the loan documents was
under economic duress as a result of plaintiff's actions.
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FIFTEENTH DEFENSE
As a result of plaintifffs actions the loan documents are
unconscionable and therefore unenforceable.

WHEREFORE, defendants pray as follows:
1.

For an order dismissing plaintiff's complaint with

prejudice.
2.

For an order awarding defendants their attorney's

fees and costs.
3.

for an order awarding such relief as the court

deems equitable in the premises.

COUNTERCLAIM
Defendants Troy Hygro Systems, Inc. (Troy), Michael R. Kehl,
Gloria F. Kehl, Donald K.Kehl, Lenore F. Kehl, Keith Kehl, and
Karen Sue Kehl, hereby assert counterclaims against the
plaintiff, State Bank of Southern Utah (State Bank) as follows:
1.

Plaintiff and counterdefendant State Bank of Southern

Utah (State Bank) is a banking corporation organized under the
laws of Utah, doing business in Iron County, Utah.
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2.

Defendant and counterclaimant Troy Hygro Systems, Inc.

(Troy) is a corporation organized in Wisconsin currently doing
business in Iron County Utah.
3.

Lee Fife is assistant Vice President and loan officer

at State Bank and at all times relevant hereto was active in the
Troy Hygro account with State Bank.
4.

Troy is in the business of growing and marketing a

unique tomato.

The tomato is grown in a greenhouse using a

hydroponic growing system.
Wisconsin.

Troy began operations in East Troy

In 1985 Troy looked to expand its operation in Utah

and Colorado.
5.

In August of 19 85 to facilitate funding for the

purchase of property, plant and equipment, in New Castle, Utah, a
request was made to the SBA in Salt Lake City seeking the
guarantee of a loan to be made to Troy Hygro by State Bank of
Southern Utah in the amount of $325,000.00.
6.

It was imperative to Troy to receive the funds in

August or early September, at the latest, so construction could
start on the new facility and a tomato crop could be planted by
early October to grow during the winter months.
7.

State Bank was aware of the time restrictions placed on

Troy and committed to loan Troy the amount of $325,000.00 upon
approval by the SBA.

000104

8.

In early September of 19 85 the SBA approved the loan in

the amount of $325,000.00.
9.

After the SBA approved the loan, however, State Bank

refused to make any disbursements to Troy as promised and it is
believed that State Bank did not have the money to loan to Troy.
10.

State Bank requested that Jim Markell, an employee of

Troy, to take the loan package, already approved by the SBA, and
go down the street in Cedar City, Utah, and try to solicit it to
other banks.
11.

During this time, Troy already had a contractor lined

up to commence with construction so that the facilities could be
completed and a tomato crop planted for the winter growing
season.

However, because no disbursements were or could be made

by State Bank as promised the construction had to be put on hold.
12.

To obtain money for the initial disbursement of the

$325,000 loan, State Bank had to sell the loan in the secondary
market which created a further delay.

It is believed that the

funds provided to Troy actually came from the sale on the
secondary market.
13.

Defendant Troy to its detriment relied upon State

Bank's promise and commitment to provide the necessary funds upon
approval of the loan by the SBA.

9
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14.

State Bank finally made an initial disbursement on the

loan in October 19 85.

However, because of the delay construction

took place in the winter months and went longer than expected and
as a result was more costly.

As a result of the increased

expenses and the late tomato crop Troy was placed in a financial
bind.
15.

Because of the additional expenses and crop delays an

additional $60,000 was necessary to complete the project.
16.

State Bank knowing the financial position and hardship

of Troy as a result of the delays and actions of the Bank,
solicited an extra loan for $60,000.00 to Troy in order to
complete the original project.
17.

In order to obtain the necessary $60,000.00 State Bank

not only required Troy and the defendants to execute a Note in
the sum of $60,000.00, but further required additional security
and guarantees from the defendants on the original loan.
18.

As a result of State Bank's failure to disburse the

necessary money as previously committed Troy was in need of
additional funds to complete the project.

State Bank continued

to solicit loans from the defendants and sought additional
guarantees from the defendants.
19.

In November of 19 88, subsequent to the guarantees

executed by the defendants, State Bank altered the material terms
10
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of the loan documents, including the terms of the Note for
$325,000.00 and the terms of the Note for $60,000.00.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Breach of Agreement to Fund
20.

Defendants hereby incorporate paragraphs 1 through 19

above herein by this reference.
21.

Through out the course of Troyfs dealing with State

Bank, State Bank made various promises and commitments to Troy
and the defendants, including but not limited to the promise to
loan $325,000.00 upon approval of the SBA.
22.

State Bank wrongfully breached its promises to the

damage and detriment of the defendant Troy in an amount to be
proven at trial.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Willful Breach of Contract and Economic Duress
23.

Defendants hereby incorporate the allegations in

paragraphs 1 through 22 above herein by this reference.
24.

Through out the course of Troy's dealing with State

Bank, State Bank made various promises to and commitments with
Troy and the defendants, including but not limited to the
commitment to provide a construction loan of $325,000.00 upon
approval by the SBA.

State Bank knew or should have known that

Troy and the defendants would reasonably rely upon these promises
and change their position as result of said promises.
11
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25.

Troy and the defendants did reasonable and justifiable

rely upon the promises of State Bank and changed their position.
The defendants based upon the commitment of State Bank placed
themselves in a position where they relied completely on State
Bank to do what it promised to do and had no reasonable
alternatives but to rely on State Bank to perform its promises.
26.

State Bank new or should have known of this reliance by

Troy and the other defendants or State Bank was reckless knowing
that defendants were without reasonable alternatives but to
accept the dictates and demands of State Bank.

State Bank

willfully breached its agreements with the defendants and
willfully placed additional demands and requirements on the
defendants knowing the defendants had no alternative but to agree
to any new change or demand placed upon them.

These arrangements

placed the defendants in economic duress where they had to either
accept the proposal, dictates and demands made by State Bank or
lose the project all together.
27.

As a result of the willful breaches committed by the

bank and economic duress placed upon the defendants the
defendants had no choice but to execute additional Trust Deeds,
personal guarantees, mortgages and other guarantees as the bank
dictated.

12
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28.

As a result of the willful breaches committed by State

Bank and economic duress placed upon the defendants, Troy and the
defendants are entitled to a cancellation of the documents not
consistent with their claims herein and an award of damages to be
proven at trial,
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Promissory Estoppel
29.

Defendants hereby incorporate paragraphs 1 through 28

above herein by this reference.
30.

Through out the course of Troy's dealing with State

Bank, the Bank made various promises to Troy and the defendants
as set forth above.
31.

State Bank knew or should have known that Troy and the

other defendants would reasonably rely upon these promises and
change their position as a result of said promises.
32.

In fact defendants in reasonable and justifiable

reliance upon the promises of State Bank did substantially change
their position and committed themselves to State Bank to provide
funds to develop the project.
33.

After Troy and the defendants changed their position

and were in a position of total reliance upon the dictates of
State Bank to fund the project, State Bank breached its promises
with Troy and the defendants and repeatedly placed additional
restrictions and conditions on the financing and required the
13
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defendants to loan an additional amount from the Bank and execute
additional guarantees all to the detriment and damage of the
project and the defendants in an amount to be proven at trial.
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Negligent Structuring and Disbursal
34.

Defendants hereby incorporate paragraphs 1 through 33

above herein by this reference.
35.

State Bank had a duty to use good faith and due care in

processing, structuring and in the disbursal of the financing,
especially in light of the fact that State Bank was aware of the
time constraints placed upon the project.
36.

The Bank wrongfully or negligently processed,

structured and disbursed the funds to Troy and the defendants.
37.

The actions of State Bank and the problems experienced

by the project bare out the fact that State Bank failed to
properly disburse the funds when committed and placed the project
in financial straits.
38.

State Bank has breached its obligation to properly

process, structure, and disburse funds under the loan commitment
to the proximate damage of Troy and the other defendants in an
amount to be proven at trial.

14
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FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Control and Self Dealing
39.

Defendants hereby incorporate paragraphs 1 through 38

above herein by this reference.
40.

As a result of the actions and conduct of State Bank,

the Bank exercised such a degree of control over the project and
the decisions of the parties that in fact the bank acted as a
principal in the project.
41.

In relation thereto State Bank at all times acted in

its own self interest on the project and contrary to interest of
Troy and the other defendants.
42.

Such actions have resulted in damage to Troy and the

other defendants in an amount to be proven at trial.

SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Breach of Duties of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
43.

Defendants hereby incorporate paragraphs 1 through 42

above herein by this reference.
44.

Under the circumstances as set forth above, State Bank

in its dealings had the general duty of good faith and fair
dealing to the defendants.
45.

The Bank breached its duties and as a result Troy and

the other defendants have been damaged in an amount to be proven
at trial.
15
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SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Accounting, Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
46.

Defendants hereby incorporate paragraphs 1 through 45

above herein by this reference.
47.

Defendants are entitled to full and complete accounting

from State Bank of all transactions complained of herein and to
declaratory relief against the Bank construing the rights and
obligations of the parties herein to the documents and other
agreements among the parties, in light of the breaches,
misrepresentations and omissions of the Bank set forth herein.
48.

Defendants are further entitled to injunctive relief

against the Bank in order to prevent irreparable injury to the
project and a loss of the project and the land, preventing the
Bank from attempting to foreclose or enforce any such documents
until the matters herein can be fully adjudicated.

WHEREFORE, defendants pray on their counterclaim, that they
be awarded damages in an amount to be proven at trial, that the
court construe all documents between the parties as requested by
the defendants and the court cancel the documents not consistent
with the claims of the defendants herein and that the court grant
an injunction preventing the plaintiff from seeking foreclosure
or to enforce any of the documents until the rights of the
parties heretofore are fully adjudicated, for attorneys fees and
16
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costs, and for such other and further relief as a court deems
just and equitable in the premises.

DATED this :?/ day of May, 1991.

BROWN & BROWN

u d g e W/ C a l l
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ^

day o5^Ma-y, 1991, I

caused to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM to:
Thomas M. Higbee
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
250 South Main Street
P.O. Box 726
Cedar City, Utah 84720
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example in' Mottern v. State (1984), Ind.
App., 466 N.E.2d 488, the First District,
finding no evidence of prejudice at all stated:
"On the other hand, the state offered no
evidence of prejudice such as unavailability of its witnesses, records, test results,
or any other reason why it would be
impossible or extremely difficult to
present its case against Mottern at this
time".
However, the issue has not been so clearly
presented as it has been in the case at bar.
Laches has been firmly engrafted upon the
post-conviction rule, as a broad equitable
doctrine, however it is in an evolutionary
stage in this context.
Rule 9(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254
Cases, 28 U.S.C.A. foil. § 2254 enacted by
Congress in 1976 incorporates the doctrine
of laches into the law governing habeas
corpus cases for the federal courts. It
provides:
A petition may be dismissed if it appears
that the state of which the respondent is
an officer has been prejudiced in its ability to respond to the petition by delay in
iUj filing unless the petitioner shows that
it is based on ground of which he could
not have had knowledge by the exercise
of reasonable diligence before the circumstances prejudicial to the state occurred.
Federal law is important in our considerations in this appeal, because it should govern this State when it decides whether or
not to afford redress for a federal constitutional wrong, which this constitutionally invalid plea surely involves.
Prior to 1976 long delay in bringing a
postconviction claim to a federal court
merely increased the burden on a petitioner. Congress in enacting Rule 9(a) took
the same step this court took in Twyman v.
State, supra, and placed the burden on the
prosecutorial authorities to prove laches.
The elements of laches in both state and
federal courts are essentially the same: unreasonable delay by the petitioner and prejudice from that delay. However, the position of Congress is that the component of

prejudice involves predudice to the state in
its ability to meet the allegations of the
post-conviction petition and not prejudice to
the state in its ability to successfully retry
the petitioner in the event post-conviction
relief is granted. Aiken v. Spalding (9th
Cir.1982), 684 F.2d 632, cert, denied, 460
U.S. 1093, 103 S.Ct. 1795, 76 L.Ed.2d 361
(1983). Chief Justice Burger, speaking for
himself alone, has suggested in a separate
statement to the denial of certiorari in the
Aiken case that Congress amend rule 9(a)
to permit prejudice to the ability of the
state to retry the petitioner successfully to
be made material to the question of delay
prejudice. Congress has been reluctant in
the past to deal with this question more
harshly.
In this appeal the question is presented
in a pristine form. The constitutionally
infirm character of the plea and conviction
is clear. That plea and conviction support*
appellant's enhanced sentence which he is
now serving for his more recent crime.
While we have said many times that the
enhancement of this newer sentence is not
a new and additional punishment for the
old crime; yet we know also that if this
infirm plea and conviction is permitted to
stand, appellant ".. in effect suffers anew
from the deprivation .." of his constitutional rights. Burgett v. Texas (1967), 389
U.S. 109, 88 S.Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319. At
this high level of judicial concern, and within this area of delayed claims, prejudice to
the State's retrial capabilities should be
declared insufficient.
GIVAN, C.J., and PIVARNIK, SHEPARD and DICKSON, JJ., vote to den/
transfer.
DeBRULER, J., dissents to the denial of
transfer with opinion.
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SECURITY BANK & TRUST CO.. Appellant (Plaintlff-Counter-defendant),
v.
Francla H. BOGARD. Appellee
(Defendant-Counter-plaintiiT).
No. 4-985A246.
Court of Appeals of Indiana,
Fourth District.
June 30, 1986.
Bank brought action against farmer on
seven promissory notes, and farmer counterclaimed alleging breach of contract to
provide loan and promissory estoppel. The
Superior Court, Vigo County. Division I,
Michael H. Eldred, J., entered judgment for
bank on promissory notes and for farmer
on counterclaim. Bank appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Miller, J., held that: (1)
bank's alleged agreement to extend credit
to farmer who was not legally bound to
borrow money from bank lacked mutuality
of obligation and, therefore, was unenforceable, and (2) statement by bank employee that he would take loan application
to committee and that bank would soon
have something for farmer was statement
of intention and statement of prediction,
and therefore, not a promise for purposes
of promissory estoppel.
Reversed.
Conover, J., dissented and filed opinion.
1. Contract* <**1(X6)
Bank's alleged agreement to extend
credit to farmer who was not legally bound
to borrow money from bank lacked mutuality of obligation and, therefore, was unenforceable.
2. Ettoppel $=»85
Doctrine of promissory estoppel requires promise which reasonably induces
action or forbearance of definite and substantial character, and which needs to be
enforced in order to avoid injustice.

3. Estoppel «=85
Mere expression of intention is not
"promise" for purpose of doctrine of promissory estoppel or formation of contract
Sec publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
4. Estoppel ^ 8 5
Prediction, opinion, or prophecy is not
"promise" for purpose of doctrine of promissory estoppel or formation of contract.
5. Estoppel «=»85
Statement by bank's employee that he
would take loan application "to the loan
committee and within two or three days,
we ought to have something here, ready
for you to go with" was expression of
intention to take application to loan committee and also contained prediction of approval and, therefore, did not contain any
"promise" as required for application of
doctrine of promissory estoppel.
H. Brent Stuckey, Hart, Bell Deem, Ewing & Stuckey, Vincennes, for appellant.
Dennis R. Majewski, Terre Haute, for
appellee.
MILLER, Judge.
Security Bank & Trust Co. sued Francis
Bogard because he was in default on seven
promissory notes. Bogard counterclaimed,
alleging Security caused the default because it agreed to a loan for his farming
operations and then refused to lend him
any money. The trial court granted judgment to Security on the defaulted notes
and to Bogard on his counterclaim for damages. Security appeals, challenging the trial court's conclusion that it was liable to
Bogard either for breach of contract or
under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
We reverse.
FACTS
Security is a banking institution with its
principal place of business in Vincennes,
Indiana and a branch in Oaktown, Indiana.
Bogard, a farmer in Sullivan County, had
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done business with Security since 1949. In
the spring of each crop season, Bogard
established a line of credit at Security
which would advance money to Bogard for
the payment of production expenses. Although repayment was to be made at harvest time, the notes were carried over
many of the years because Bogard was
unable to repay them.
Bogard's loans did not require approval
by the loan committee of the bank for the
first twenty or twenty-five years of their
banking relationship. For the last eight or
nine years, however, Bogard was aware his
jredit lines had to be approved by a loan
committee in Vincennes at the main branch.
Nevertheless, Bogard claimed that the pre
vious Oaktown branch manager, Bruce Mayall, told him the loan committee acted
upon his recommendation so that Bogard
concluded the loan committee approval was
simply a formality.
1981 and 1982 were two years of losses
for Bogard. In 1982, Bogard was unable
to pay his indebtedness for the year plus
his carryover from the 1981 losses. At the
conclusion of the 1982 crop season, Bogard
continued to owe Security in excess of $28,000.
Bogard began negotiating with Michael
Chestnut, the Oaktown Security branch
manager, in January of 1983 to obtain financing for the 1983 crop year. Chestnut
informed Bogard that Security would need
additional collateral to secure the past indebtedness and the 1983 credit line because
of the carryover losses from 1981 and 1982.
In March, Chestnut and Bogard began discussing the possibility of real estate as a
collateral for the loan. The two discussed
the possibility of a mortgage on twentyfive acres of Bogard's farm land or his
house and four acres. After the bank assistant took pictures of the property, Chestnut suggested a value of $1,500 per acre on
the 25 acres of farm land for the security
on the loan. In Bogard's words, Chestnut
said, "Well, I'll take this to the loan committee and within two or three days, we
ought to have something here, ready for
you to go with." Record, pp. 124-25.

Chestnut later informed Bogard that the
loan committee turned down the twenty,
five acres as insufficient security. He informed Bogard that Security wanted the
additional security of a first mortgage on
the house and four acres, a second mortgage on the remainder of his farm, and a
first mortgage on his crops and equipment
Bogard was unwilling to comply with these
terms.
Meanwhile, Bogard attempted to secure
financing elsewhere. The FHA turned him
down because he was not the sole operator
of his own farm. He was also rejected by
First National Bank of Terre Haute because he had three consecutive losses in hU
farming operations.
On July 15, 1983, Security sued Bogard
because he was in default on seven different promissory notes totalling $29,982.72.
Bogard counterclaimed, alleging Security
agreed to extend him credit so that he
could carry on his farming operations. He
claimed that as a result of Security's failure to fulfill the promise, he was damaged
as a result, including his failure to pay the
defaulted notes. To support his claim of
damages, Bogard testified that based on
Security's representation, he had arranged
to rent two hundred and fifty acres of
soybean land, forty acres of additional watermelon ground, and equipment, all of
which fell through due to lack of financing.
He later admitted, however, that the reason he did not obtain the two hundred and
fifty acres of soybean land was that the
owner had previously rented the land for a
two year period to another tenant the year
before.
The trial court entered judgment for Security on its claim and Bogard on his counterclaim, and entered the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
"FINDINGS OF FACT
1. That Plaintiff/bank and Defendant/counterplaintiff/Bogard
had engaged in a course of doing business since
1949.

2. That such business consisted of the
bank loaning Bogard money to operate
his farm in the coming year.
3. That from year to year Bogard
paid his notes one year late, paying only
current interest and then the principal
the following year from that year's farm
income.
4. That the parties had continued this
practice for a number of years, perhaps
as long as 35 years.
5. That by the admission of the
bank's loan officer, Mike Chestnut, Bogard had been a "good customer".
6. That plaintiff had agreed to extend
credit to Bogard for the farming year
1982.
7. That in 1982, without notice to Bogard, the bank decided not to extend said
credit citing a change in bank policy as
the reason.
8. That in disregard of prior practice
and the regular course of business the
plaintiff decided to enforce the terms of
the notes as written.
9. That under the strict terms of the
notes Bogard was in default
10. That as a result of plaintiffs denial of credit for the farming year 1982,
Bogard was unable to plant crops to
make income and thus was unable to
make any payments on the notes.
11. That as a result of the denial of
credit for the year 1982, Bogard lost
projected profits from the sale of soybeans, grain and watermelons.
12. That Bogard, in reliance of the
promise of plaintiff, to extend credit and
in reliance of his prior course of doing
business with plaintiff entered into contracts and agreements with third parites
[sic] to his detriment and damage.
I. As Security notes In Us brief, conclusions of
law 2 and 3-—that the parties had modified the
terms of the notes and that strict performance
was waived by Security—are irrelevant conclusions because the trial court concluded that Bogard was in default and that Security should
have judgment on the notes. Moreover, Bogard

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. That plaintiff caused in whole or
part defendant's breach on the notes.
2. By their actions over a large numger (sic) of years, and by oral modification, the parties modified the terms of
the notes sued upon so that any party
seeking a change could not do so unilaterally.
3. Strict performance of the terms of
the notes was waived by plaintiff because their acts showed a relinquishment
of several provisions of the notes.
JUDGMENT
It is hereby ordered that Defendant is
in default on the notes sued upon and
that Plaintiff shall have judgment as
prayed.
It is further ordered that Defendant/counterclaimant have judgment on
his counterclaim due to Plaintiff/counterdefendant bank's breach of contract.
Counterplaintiff has shown extensive
damages, and the Court grants counterplaintiff judgment thereon, however, in
the interests of justice and based upon
the vicissitudes and speculative nature of
farming income the Court grants judgment to counterplaintiff only to the extent that those damages offset the damages of Plaintiff. The Court thus finds
both judgments are satisfied.
Costs to Plaintiff."
Record, pp. 75-76.1
Security appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in four areas of the
trial court's findings and conclusions:
(1) That Security entered into a binding
contract to extend Bogard credit for the
1983 crop year;
(2) That Security is liable on the basis of
promissory estoppel;
does not appeal the propriety of granting Security judgment on the defaulted notes so we need
not consider any apparent conflict between the
trial court's conclusions and the judgment with
respect to Security's claim on the defaulted
notes.
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(3) That Chestnut, the branch manager,
had apparent authority to bind Security to
provide the line of credit for the 1983 crop
year; and
(4) That Bogard's damages equaled the
amount he owed Security on the defaulted
notes.
We reach no consideration on the issue of
Chestnut's apparent authority or the
court's novel and innovative computation of
Bogard's alleged damages because we find
Security is not liable under the theory of
breach of contract or of promissory estoppel.
DECISION
The crux of Security's first two issues—
whether there was a breach of contract or
promissory estoppel—centers on the trial
court's findings of fact 6 and 12 and conclusion of law 1: that Security agreed to
extend Bogard credit for the 1983 farm
year; * that in reliance on Security's promise to extend him credit, Bogard entered
into contracts and agreements with third
parties to his detriment and damage; and
that Security caused in whole or in part
Bogard's breach on the notes. Because
Security and Bogard are unsure of the
exact theory the trial court used to arrive
at its conclusion that Security was liable
for Bogard's damages—either because Security entered into a valid contract with
Bogard to extend him credit which it then
breached or because it was liable upon the
theory of promissory estoppel—we will address both issues.
Enforceability of Contract
[1] A fundamental concept of contract
law is that a contract is unenforceable if it
lacks mutuality of obligation—i.e., if it fails
to obligate the parties to do anything.
Seco Chemicals, Inc. v. Stewart (1976), 169
Ind.App. 624, 349 N.E.2d 733. The general
rule is explained as follows:
"Mutuality of obligation is essential to
the validity of an executory bilateral contract which is based solely on mutual
2.

The findings of fact erroneously identify 1982
as the year of the dispute between Bogard and
Security. The record reveals and the parties

promises or covenants and unless both
parties are legally bound, so that each
may hold the other liable for its breach,
the contract lacks mutuality and neither
party its bound. Thus, mutuality is absent when only one of the contracting
parties is bound to perform, and the other party remains entirely free to choost
whether or not to perform, and the
rights of the parties exist at the option of
one only."
17 C.J.S. Contracts § 100(1X1963).
Wvrv, Bogard was not legally bound to
borrow the money from Security. In fact,
Bogard testified he unsuccessfully attempted to seek financing elsewhere in lieu of
obtaining a loan from Security. Because
Bogard had no obligation to obtain his financing from Security, any alleged contract between Security and Bogard lacked
mutuality of obligation and was thus unenforceable.
Promissory Estoppel
[2) Bogard also attempts to justify the
trial court's judgment on the theory of
promissory estoppel. While it is true that
an otherwise unenforceable promise may
be enforced under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, it is crucial to the promisee's
cause that he establish the elements necessary for the doctrine to apply. Succinctly
stated, the doctrine of promissory estoppel
applies where there is: 1) a promise, 2)
which the promissor should reasonably expect to induce action or forebearance of a
definite and substantial character, 3) which
does, in fact, induce such action or forebearance, and 4) injustice can only be avoided by enforcement of the promise. Tipton
County Farm Bureau Co-op v. Hoover
(1985), Ind.App., 475 N.E.2d 38. We need
not consider the last three of these elements because Bogard's argument is fatally flawed on the first element—the existence of a promise.
(3,41 Although it is recognized that no
special form of words is necessary to creagrce that 1983 is the proper year, and we will
assume the trial court intended to refer to 1983
and not 1982 in its findings.
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ite a promise, the mere expression of an
intention is not a promise. 17 Am.Jur.2d
Contracts § 3 (1964) (citing E.I. Dupont
Dt Nemours & Co. v. ClairborncReno
Co. (8th Cir.1933), 64 F.2d 224, cert denied, 290 U.S. 646, 54 S.Ct 64, 78 L.Ed.
561). Thus, where A says, "I am going to
tell my house. I want $70,000 for it," he
has made a mere statement of intention
tnd not a promise. L. Simpson, Contracts
} 2 (1965) (citing Farina v. Fickus (1900), 1
Ch. 331). Moreover, a prediction, opinion,
or prophecy is not a promise. Calamari &
Perillo, Contracts § 2-6 (1977). For example, when a father asked a doctor how long
hU son would be in the hospital and the
doctor replied, "Three or four days, not
over four," the doctor was not liable when
the son remained in the hospital for over a
month because the doctor had made a prediction and not a promise. Id. (citing Haw.kins v, McGee (1929), 84 N.H. 114, 146 A.
$41.
(5) Here, the trial court concluded Security promised to loan Bogard money
when—according to Bogard's testimonyChestnut said, "Well, I'll take this to the
loan committee and within two or three
dayB, we ought to have something here,
ready for you to go with." Record, pp.
124-25. The first portion of this statement, however—that he would take the
application to the loan committee—was an
expression of intention. Moreover, Chestnut's statement that they ought to have
something in two or three days ready for
him to go with was a prediction. As we
previously stated, neither a prediction nor a
statement of intention is a promise.1
Thus, we conclude no contract existed
between Security and Bogard because
there was no mutuality of obligation, and
Bogard was not entitled to recover under
the doctrine of promissory estoppel because no promise was made by Security.
3. Bogard also cites Tipton County Farm Bureau,
supra, in support of his argument that the fact
he had been involved with Security for thirtyfour years and with Chestnut for eleven or
twelve years establishes that Security promised
to lend him money. In Tipton County, however,
an oral promise was made. The length of time

Hence, the trial court's judgment for Bogard on his counterclaim must be reversed.
YOUNG, PJ., concurs in majority opinion.
CONOVER, J., dissents with opinion.
CONOVER, Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. There was substantial evidence supporting the trial
court's finding of promissory estoppel in
my opinion.
Bogard had been doing business with
Security for 34 years. Throughout this
relationship, Security apparently had
cloaked its Oaktown branch managers with
the authority to approve whatever loans
the managers and Bogard agreed upon.
The lending committee's so-called final approval was a mere "rubber stamp" formality under the apparent authority the bank
bestowed upon the two branch managers
with whom Bogard had dealt during that
period.
Over the years, Bogard had relied upon
the branch managers' claims they had the
authority to make the loans he had received
from time to time. Bogard never had been
turned down and was, according to Security's assertions, a good customer. Based
upon past practice, Bogard reasonably believed he would receive the loan he needed
to prepare for his upcoming year's farming
transactions because the branch manager
had approved it. Nothing in the evidence
can reasonably be said to put him on notice
the approval procedure for this loan would
be different from the bank's past practice.
Farming provided Bogard with his livelihood, Bogard's reliance was of a substantial character. Given the long standing
nature of the relationship and the detriment which arose from the bank's refusal
to make the loan, it is clear to me injustice
that the parties had conducted business was
probative of another element—whether the
promissor should reasonably expect his promise
to induce action or forebearance of a definite
and substantial character—and not the determination of whether there was a promise or not.
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can be avoided only by enforcing the agreement. See, Citizens State Bank v. Peoples
Dank (1985), Ind.App., 475 N.E.2d 324, 327;
Larabee v. Booth (1984), Ind.App., 463
N.E.2d 487, 490; sec also Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 90 (West 1981).
A general judgment will be affirmed if it
can be sustained on any legal theory by
evidence introduced at trial. Erie-Haven v.

Tippmann

Refrigeration

Construction

(1985), Ind.App., 486 N.E.2d 646, 648. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court's
finding on the basis of promissory estoppel
and remand for further proceedings to determine appropriate damages.
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The BANK OF NEW YORK and
Dreyfus Liquid Assets, Inc.,
Defendants-Appellants,
v.
Mildred BRIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellee.
No. 2-985A290.
Court of Appeals of Indiana,
Second District.
June 30, 1986.

I. Appeal and Error e=>236(l)
Bank and investment company could
not claim they were prejudiced in their
defense against client's breach of contract
theory, and trial court did not abuse discretion in permitting client to pursue said theory, which client informed bank and investment company that she would assert three
days prior to trial, where bank and investment company failed to request continuance when evidence supporting theory wa«
adduced at trial. Trial Procedure Rule
15(B).
2. Pleading <3=307
Trial court could properly permit client
to litigate her breach of contract claim
against investment company and bank, notwithstanding her failure to comply with
trial rule requiring party asserting claim
based on written contract to attach document to pleading; trial court was not required to order compliance with trial rule.
Trial Procedure Rule 9.2(A).
3. Compromise and Settlement $=>5(2)
Actions of bank and investment company in fully recrediting client's account prior
to trial on claim resulting from improper
liquidation of account constituted only unilateral offer to settle controversy and did
not preclude client from recovering compensatory damages, where client never accepted the offer to settle.

Affirmed.
Sullivan, J., concurred in result.

6. Appeal and Error <3=»756
Applicability of provision in client's account application absolving bank and investment company of liability for acting on
instructions believed to be genuine to
client's action arising out of their improj>er
liquidation of her account would not be
addressed, absent citation to authority in
support of argument. Rules App.Proc.,
Rule 8.3(AX7).
7. Appeal and Error <*=*1078<4). 1079
Contention that trial court erred when
it gave client's instructions on tortious conversion and accord and satisfaction, in action against investment company and bank
arising from improper liquidation of client's
account, was waived by failure of bank and
investment company to set out in their
briefs verbatim objections to instructions
and to make more than barest argument in
support of position. Rules App.Proc., Rule
8.3(A)(7); Trial Procedure Rule 51(C).
8. Damages <3=»214

4. Banks and Banking «=>100, 315(1)
Client brought action against investment company and bank as result of improper liquidation of her account. The
Hamilton Circuit Court, Judith S. Proffitt,
J., entered judgment on jury verdict in favor of client for $30,000 and bank and
investment company appealed. The Court
of Appeals, Ratliff, J., held that: (1) trial
court did not abuse discretion in permitting
client to pursue breach of contract theory,
and (2) evidence supported award of compensatory and punitive damages.

cite as 494 N.K_2d 970(Ind.App 2 DUI. I9M)
RATLIFF, Judge, writing by designaformed of its error in liquidating client's
tion.
account was sufficient to support finding
that bank and investment company had enSTATEMENT OF THE CASE
gaged in tortious conduct of type warrantAppellants, The Bank of New York and
ing punitive damages, where bank and inDreyfus Liquid Assets, Inc., appeal from a
vestment company failed to adequately rejudgment
entered by the Hamilton Circuit
spond to several inquiries of client's husCourt on a jury verdict in favor of Mildred
band and attorney concerning disputed
Bright for $30,000. We affirm.
transaction.

Client asserting claim against investment company and bank aa result of improper liquidation of her account was required to establish, by clear and convincing
evidence, that conduct exhibited elemenU
of fraud, malice, gross negligence, or oppression, to recover punitive damages, regardless of whether she ultimately succeeded on theory of either breach of contract or tortious conversion.
5. Banks and Banking «=»100, 315(1)
Evidence of conduct of bank and investment company once it had been in-

Instruction on mitigation of damages
was not required in action by client against
bank and investment company for improper
liquidation of account absent evidence indicating that client could have reasonably
taken additional steps to mitigate damages.

M. Kent Newton, Kelly R. Noma, Tabbe rt & Capehart, Indianapolis, for defendants-appellanU.
C. Wendell Martin, Robert L. Hartley,
Jr., Martin, Wade, Hartley, Hollingsworth,
Indianapolis, for plaintiff-appellee.

FACTS
Mildred Bright opened an investment account with Dreyfus Liquid Assets in December, 1981. The Bank of New York, as
transfer agent for Dreyfus Liquid Assets,
had custody of and administered this account. By October, 1982, Mildred's account had a balance of $6,165.84.
Sometime near the end of September,
1982, the bank received instructions from a
Mildred Bright of Solana Beach, California,
to liquidate the account she held in the
Dreyfus Mutual Fund. The signature on
this order was guaranteed by the brokerage firm of Dean Witter Reynolds. The
bank, however, liquidated the Dreyfus Liquid Assets account belonging to Mildred
Bright of Indianapolis, Indiana. On October 4, 1982, the bank issued a check to
Mildred Bright of Indianapolis, Indiana, for
$6,185.84, but mailed it to Mildred Bright
of Solana Beach, California, who promptly
cashed it.
On February 7, 1983, Mildred Bright of
Indianapolis, Indiana, received her quarterly dividend advice statement from Dreyfus
Liquid Assets showing that her account
had a zero balance. The following day
Mildred's husband, Joe, called the toll free
number printed on the advice to inquire
about the status of her account He was
told that the bank had a research department to handle these problems and to call
again in 24 to 48 hours. When Joe called
on February 10, 1983, he was told the matter was being researched. At that time, he
requested a copy of the liquidation transaction and was told one would be s e n t Five
days later Joe made his third call to the
bank's toll free number and was informed
that the matter was still being researched.
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STATE OF UTAH
STATE BANK OF SOUTHERN
UTAH, a Utah banking
corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
TROY HYGRO SYSTEMS, INC.;
MICHAEL R. KEHL; GLORIA
F. KEHL; LENORE F. KEHL;
KEITH KEHL; KAREN SUE
KEHL and JOHN DOES 1
through 10,
Defendants.
TROY HYGRO STSTEMS, INC.;
MICHAEL R. KEHL; GLORIA
F. KEHL; LENORE F. KEHL;
KEITH KEHL; KAREN SUE
KEHL,
Counterclaimants,
vs.
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A

Yes, at that point, yes.

Q

Now, at some point you went into the State

A

Yes.

Q

Do you recall when that was?

A

I would guess it would be mid to late

Bank?

January with basically the same package that we had at
Zions.
Q

I would like to have, if you would,

basically, meeting by meeting and discussion by
discussion, take me through your dealings with State
Bank.

I realize you are not going to be able to give

me every date, but to the extent that we can, I would
like to keep the significant discussions and meetings
separate so that we can sort of piece this together.
Tell me what your first meeting was with State Bank or
any of its representatives?
A

My first meeting was with Lee.

Q

Do you recall when that was?

A

Here again, mid to late January.

Q

That was in his office?

A

In his office at State Bank, right.

Q

Do you recall who else was present, if

anyone?
A

I think he may have -- I don't know if
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anyone was present for our t a l k s , but I think he
introduced me -- here a g a i n , we had been there with
our checking account, but I don't think I had even
Lee before that.

He may have

met

introduced me to Elwyn

and some of the other g u y s , but basically that's it.
Q

Did you bring any papers with you to that

first meeting?
A

I don't r e m e m b e r .

I don't recall if I had

the SBA papers with me or if I had just come in to
initially meet Lee and talk to him conceptually

about

this .
Q

Do you remember w h a t was said and by whom

in that first meeting?
A

I basically

laid out the plan as we had

proposed it to Zions B a n k .

Lee reacted to that plan

or to that explanation of and conception of what we
were doing in at least a little bit above a neutral
fashion.

Sounds good, b r i n g the papers in.

He

probably didn't even say it sounded good, but we will
take a look at it.
Q

Do you recall him saying anything else

response to your

in

inquiry?

A

No.

Q

Tell me a l i t t l e b i t about the plan

you submitted to him.

Did

that

it include continuing
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lease the four greenhouses

from the Christensens

were already in place or did it contemplate at

that

that

time that you would purchase the four greenhouses

that

were already in place?
A

Initially, we had planned to continue

leasing those greenhouses from Boyd and b u i l d i n g ,
I think w e , even at that t i m e , had gone from six
five.

to

I don't recall s p e c i f i c a l l y , but let's say

we w e n t from six to five on one of the 20 acre
or on the 40 across the road.

That was the

and

that

parcels

initial

plan and that we were trying to see if we could
enough money by using the two 20 acre parcels

get

as

collateral to basically buy the greenhouses and

put

those units up.
Q

On the 20 acres?

A

R i g h t , or 40 or w h a t e v e r .

Q

Did M r . Fife ask y o u to come back or did

ask you to get information
did he tell you to do after
A
anything.

he

and then come back or w h a t
that?

I don't know that he told me to do
We agreed that I w o u l d come back

later that week or the next week with the
some more specific information

probably

information,

about what we

proposed

to d o .
Q

What did you do after that first
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A

I would probably have been on the phone to

Mike that evening and basically reported to him

about

the meeting with Lee and m a d e sure that I had all of
the information, the pro formas that had been

provided

for Zions and whatever i n f o r m a t i o n , if indeed he had
asked me for more information.

I don't know that he

would have at that point b e c a u s e he hadn't seen
anything, but basically get all of the data

together

that we had accumulated and go see Lee again.
Q

Did you do that?

A

Yes.

Q

Do you recall what data you put

A

We had some of the SBA forms that had

filled out.

together?

I don't recall w h i c h ones had been

o u t , but probably the simpler ones that would

been
filled

require

like appraisals and things like that.
Certainly pro formas on w h a t we projected

could

be done based on what we already had done in New
Castle.

Probably geothermal d a t a , h e a t , what it cost

us to heat these things so you could show where

the

potential for covering the debt would be and t h e n , of
c o u r s e , the cost of the g r e e n h o u s e s .

Since we were

manufacturing the greenhouses t h e m s e l v e s , that would
have been part of it.
Q

You would have already had that
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internally?
A

We would have already had that.

All of

the

ratios and things like t h a t , Mike and Lee did over

the

p h o n e , I'm sure.

I'm

sure I am not that

financially

oriented to be able to do that kind of thing, but
basically the simpler t h i n g s that I could
would have been probably

provide

in a package at that

second

meeting.
Q

When did that second meeting take

place?

A

I would guess some time either late

January

or first part of February of '85.
Q

Do you recall who was present at that

meeting?
A

That would h a v e just been Lee and I.

Q

Tell me what was said and by whom at t h a t

meeting?
A

Lee, at that p o i n t , would probably

have

said he would take a look at i t ,
Q

Do you recall anything else specific

being

discussed?
A

No.

Q

When you say probably would have said t h a t ,

t h a t tells me that you d o n ' t remember exactly, but
are assuming from all of the other facts that you
that that's what took

you
know

place?
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A

Right.

point.

Lee didn't write me a check at

that

Let's put it that way.
MR. HIGBEE:

Off the record for just

one

second.
(Brief
Q

recess)

(By Mr. Higbee) M r . M a r k e l l , I believe

we went off the record, we were basically up to

when

the

second meeting with M r . F i f e , chronologically, and
were just kind of going through your meetings

and

dealings with the bank from start to finish.

Do

recall anything else of that second meeting of

we

you

any

significance?
A

No.

Q

What happened

A

The next thing I recall and I know

next?
that

there had to be subsequent meetings between Lee
m y s e l f , but the next thing that I can remember
because we meet a lot.

and
--

I don't know, but a c o u p l e

or three times a week s o m e t i m e s .

two

If I happened to be

in t h e r e , I would stop and we would talk about

where

we were as far as what information we needed to be
g a t h e r i n g , as far as putting an SBA thing t o g e t h e r
here again, still on the first initial $170,000
The next one that I recall was when

thing.

Boyd

Christensen shocked me basically by being a little
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insistent that we consider purchasing.
March.

That was in

Now, we go from January or the latter part of

January, first part of February, to the latter part of
March.
Q

So two months span?

A

Yeah.

Here again, the individual meetings

with Lee between the end of January or the first part
of March and that one meeting when I came back to him
with the information I got from Boyd, I don't know
what transpired there.
Q

Would it be safe to say that just what I

will call the routine fact gathering and discussions?
A

Right.

I would characterize it that way,

right.
Q

Anything of significance you recall being

said?
MR. CALL:
Q

During what time?

(By Mr. Higbee) During this two month time

period, between the end of January and the end of
March?
A

Nothing significant other than we had not

been discouraged from continuing this process of
gathering information to try to put this loan
together.
Q

But at that point, no commitments had been
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made?
A

No.

Q

Now, you have referenced this

with Boyd Christensen.

Where did that

conversation

conversation

take place?
A

This one took place in his corral out at

his farm in New Castle towards the end of March of
'85.

It might have even been the first part of

April.
Q

Who was present?

A

Boyd and m y s e l f .

Q

Tell me what M r . Christensen said and

what

you said in return?
A

Specifically, I was down there because

we

had been having some problems to having to heat the
greenhouses.

That was this pump situation, I t h i n k .

There was some problem of getting him to pay part of
our costs for leasing the operation.

Apparently

was some things that had gone wrong that he

there

assumed

liability for and we were trying to get him to pay

for

it.
Q

This is the well pump that you are

talking

about?
A

Yeah.

I think this is the well pump p o i n t .

He was pretty adamant about -- at this p o i n t , I think
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the money between you and Michael in that second
conversation?
A

Probably nothing other than the fact

he had always said that he needed money.
money.

Boyd always needed m o n e y .

that

He needed

He would

comment

that if he had a million d o l l a r s , he would just blow
it f a r m i n g .
Q

Just keep farming until it was gone?

A

Yeah, that's r i g h t .

Q

So in that s e n s e , it wasn't a real

that Boyd needed the money
A

No.

surprise

then?

Here a g a i n , unless you got into his

p e r s o n a l stuff, and you w o u l d n ' t want to do t h a t .
Q

What happened next?

By now I take it we

are somewhere around the first part of A p r i l , w i t h i n
the first few days of April?
A

Right.

Q

Tell me what happened next in relation

this entire
A

transaction?
The next thing that's in my mind was

to see L e e , here again, still talking

going

about'maybe

c o l l a t e r a l i z i n g this and building the greenhouse
the

to

on

20 and telling him -- I remember meeting in A p r i l .

It w a s n ' t April Fool's Day.

It was income tax.

It

was the 15th of A p r i l , 1985 because it was IRS day
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I was going to be late.

I told Lee that Boyd had

mentioned buying the place and I remember

specifically

laying that o u t , not trying to draw Lee in or
anything, because it was something totally out of
world to me how —
could do that.

this

w e l l , there was just no way we

When I told him Boyd wanted

150,000

for t h a t , and that was totally out of the p i c t u r e , I
was shocked that Lee even flicked the bait out at a l l .
Q

What was his

A

His response w a s , w e l l , let's not jump to

conclusions.

response?

Let's take a look at it.

exactly what he said.

That was

We will take a look at i t ,

because I was just floored.
Q

That was sort of Lee's pat answer is we

will take a look at it?
A
a no sale.

Yeah, exactly.

But obviously, to me it was

To me it was an absolute impossibility

and

for Lee to even say, w e l l , let's take a look at it was
cause for doing back flips because Lee was our guy.
Q

You said several times that for y o u , you

thought it would be impossible or difficult and I
can't remember the exact words you used.

But was

because you were concerned that you would not be
to put up enough collateral to take care of the
desires to be

that
able

bank's

secured?
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A

I would have to say that I felt it was way

out in left field and probably because of my lack of
f i n a n c i a l wherewithal.

I didn't know the o p t i o n s .

d i d n ' t know -- to me it was just like why
would w a n t to spend $30,000 on a car.

I

anybody

It has a lot to

do w i t h my background and the way I was brought up and
t h i n g s and it was totally off b a s e .
Q
company's

Did you have any concerns about the
ability to meet the debt service if you had

to b o r r o w the $150,000 or do you recall that
to

occurring

you?
A

greenhouses

W e l l , all the pro formas were based on
at that p o i n t .

The pro formas

nine

indicated

that there would be absolutely no problem, even if we
did half of what we had projected.
break w a s , but it was something

I forget w h a t

the

like ten pounds a

p l a n t or twelve pounds a plant or w h a t e v e r .

So I felt

p r e t t y good about t h a t , but it was just a matter
t h e r e ' s no way anybody would loan —

that

let's face i t ,

Zions Bank turned us d o w n .
Q

Mike and I talked a little about that

his d e p o s i t i o n .

Fifteen hundred dollars is a h e a l t h y

a m o u n t and there's not an awful lot of
b e t w e e n that and the debt service
A

in

difference

amount?

Right.
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Q

Anything else you remember being

in that

discussed

conversation?

A

We would have periodic conversations

that.

like

From that p o i n t , his attitude changed and when

he found out that we were actively trying, putting
forth an effort to basically getting what he wanted,
to buy his land, his attitude changed considerably

and

I think he did everything he could to help us and
himself
Q

at the same time to see that happen.
What did you do next to move this project

forward?
A

I would guess that at this point -- n o , I

don't g u e s s , but I would say specifically
probably

that

in May, it had gotten to the point where it

had gotten serious that Mike and Lee had talked

ratios

and all of these specific terminologies that I'm

not

real connected with, but that it was serious and it
was time to get appraisals and put into

practicality

what at that point was theory, that maybe these

things

would be worth X amount of d o l l a r s .
What's the geothermal resource worth based

on

all of these appraisals, so at that p o i n t , it would
have been in earnest.

I think it was May or June

even

when the appraisal was d o n e , the first one.
Q

Did you have meetings with M r . Fife
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this

time?
A

I met with Lee F i f e , at that point

at

least, conservatively twice a week.
Q

Is there any one particular meeting

that period of t i m e , and I'm

during

going from late April

of

'85 t h r o u g h , I b e l i e v e , you threw out the term June of
'85, so basically the last part of A p r i l , May

and

J u n e , any one meeting that stands out in your mind

of

any discussions with M r . Fife?
A

N o , not at a l l .

positive.

It was always up beat

Take it step by s t e p .

Lee would

and

basically

tell me what information he needed, where we are a t .
We have got to get the a p p r a i s a l s , so I would
arrangements

for that to h a p p e n .

make

At whatever stage

we

w e r e , it was up to me to do the leg work, whether

it

be getting updated financial statements from East

Troy

and basically push their button back there to get

them

to supply information or get it ourselves so that we
could get this package put
Q

together.

During this period of time, did you

guys

h a v e a time table that you were shooting for to
things
A

in place and

get

completed?

We had a loose time table that had

been

pro formaed o u t , I t h i n k , optimistically on one e n d , I
t h i n k , it was the end of July of

'85 that that

WENDY K. R A N D A L L , CSR, RPR
(801) 363-7939

would

56

have been the best of all possible worlds to start
construction through, I think, the end of September or
maybe even the middle of September.
formas, whatever the pro formas were.

It's on the pro
Obviously

that's what everything was based on was the pro formas
too, so the timing was there.
Q

Do you recall discussing the timing with

Mr. Fife in any of these conversations from the first
meeting in January up through the end of June that we
are to now, chronologically?
A

At that point, we hadn't even approached

our optimum time table.

There wasn't any discussion

about the timing at this point.

Believe me, we were

real busy doing the other things.
Q

And production and stuff?

A

Oh, yes, exactly.

Q

What are the kinds of things -- I realize

that you can't remember every discussion that you had
in that two month period, but what are the kinds of
things that you discussed?

Focus in as narrowly as

you can and without pinning it down to a certain day,
tell me what you and Lee talked about during those two
months?
A

I would say probably 75 percent of our

conversation had to do with problems that we were
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having getting information.

The Christensens -- we

would have an appraisal done and pay for it and
everything would be h u n k y - d o r y

and have the

legal

description done and they would say, oh, there's a
p i p e l i n e on the back of this property.

So we w o u l d

have to redo.

electric

That's one e x a m p l e .

The

company had to have a right of way right down
middle.

So we had to hassle with that.

the

And of

c o u r s e , all the T's had to be crossed and I's

dotted

for the SBA, so there were many instances like t h a t .
Set backs and the easements and it was just a big
hassle.
Q

Just sort of n o b o d y ' s fault type of

A

That would be 75 percent of the

conversations.
p r e t t y good.

things?

It always started, how's it g o i n g ,
How's everything with you and then

the

last part of it would be w e l l , what do you t h i n k , h o w
do you think things look and Lee would a l w a y s , I
t h i n k , probably be very careful not to mislead us

that

t h i s is a done deal because at that p o i n t , it w a s n ' t .
Q

This is through

A

Right.

Q

What kind of things would he say to let

k n o w it was not a done
A

June?

you

deal?

W e l l , the board hasn't approved
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I have tried to do.

Is there anything else

that

happened in this period of time that you think is of
significance that is in addition to the things
you have told us about
A

already?

Through what?
MR. CALL:

Q

that

Are you asking May and June?

(By M r . Higbee) I'm

asking you through

June

of 1985.
A

N o , I think that about covers it.

had our noses to the grindstone
Q

We

just

at that point in t i m e .

I don't know why we ended up with J u n e .

That's just where things stopped and now we will

pick

up and g o .

But tell me after June what happened

as

this matter

progressed?

A

From probably the mid part of June right on

through to the closing, the pressures began as far as
our time table of construction

scenario with

relationship to how much of this work had been

done

and the delays that had not only preceded u s , but
I foresaw coming up.

At that p o i n t , I wouldn't

that I started to get worried

that

say

about it, but at that

p o i n t , I would mention it periodically to Lee.
Q

This was towards the end of June of 19 --

A

First part of July.

Q

You mentioned the pressures that
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time?
A

I would say things like w e l l , I hope we

can

get this put together pretty soon because I have

got

to get started or at least start to make p l a n s .

At

this p o i n t , we didn't even have a v e r b a l , that I
r e c a l l , but I knew that the bank itself I don't

think

had to have SBA formal approval to at least run it by
their board of d i r e c t o r s .

I think they were one of

those banks that could do it independently, I t h i n k .
Q

Did you discuss that with Mr. Fife?

A

I mentioned

Q

What was his

A

We would have to go through the

channels.

it a couple of t i m e s , y e s •
response?
regular

I really d o n ' t , at this p o i n t , recall

they would b e .

Whether

what

it would be the board at the

bank would approve it first or whether it goes to

Salt

Lake or whatever.

had

But he was up there a lot.

He

been talking with the guys up there about what some

of

the possibilities were down here and it led me to
b e l i e v e that at that p o i n t things looked pretty

good.

Q

Some more of this cautious optimism

stuff?

A

At that point in t i m e , it was probably

more

than c a u t i o u s .
Q
believe

Tell me what M r . Fife said to make
it was more than

you

cautious?
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A

Things like it looks pretty good was one of

the more common ones.
by them syndrome.

He stopped the we will run

That was not there any more.

had got down to s p e c i f i c s , if this and this and

it
He

this.

For instance, if the r a t i o s , the loan ratios are this
and we have that it is collateralized

to this d e g r e e ,

then that will fly with the financial folks at the
or the bank, things like that.
Let's put it that way.

SBA

It was less n e g a t i v e .

At least it was more p o s i t i v e .

It wasn't -- here a g a i n , we didn't have a check y e t ,
so I can't say that Lee was overly optimistic, but

it

was definitely get your heart racing.
Q

Over what period of time were these

comments that you just described to me?
A

This would be from the first part of

July

until we did get a v e r b a l , which I think was A u g u s t

or

something.
Q

Verbal commitment from the SBA?

A

Right.

Q

So Lee would make these types of

up until the verbal

comments

approval?

A

Right.

Q

When the verbal approval came in, w h a t e v e r

time that w a s , do you recall discussing that with M r .
Fife?
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A

Sure.

As far as I was led to b e l i e v e , a

verbal was the next step to getting the money.
was my understanding.

We knew we had to go

That

through

the steps of the formal a p p l i c a t i o n , but that was a
breeze because basically all of the work we had
already done was satisfactory

and up to snuff and

we had to do was put it down on paper and slide
through and we are in.

all

it

It was going to be a b r e e z e .

It had better have been a breeze at that p o i n t ,
because we were definitely now into the period

where

it was going to be nip and tuck if we could get

it

finished and in production on s c h e d u l e .
Q

When Mr. Fife told you that the SBA had

given verbal approval, was that in a face to
meeting or on the

face

telephone?

A

Face to face m e e t i n g

in his office.

Q

At or shortly about the date that

that

approval was given?
MR. CALL:

W h a t approval are you

talking

about?
Q

(By Mr. H i g b e e ) The SBA verbal

A

It was that day.

I think he had told

that he had talked to them in the morning.
been up there and presented

approval?
me

He had

I don't know what

d o c u m e n t s , but had talked to -- what was his n a m e ,
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Stan DeConno or something.
Q

What did he say to you at that time?

A

He was happy that they had approved -- it

was verbally approved and they had approved it.

We

got the verbal approval, was basically what he said.
Q

Did he tell you what that meant?

What

were

the words he used?
A
great.

We got the v e r b a l approval and it looks
It looks good.

application now.

We will do the

formal

I would probably have asked

w e l l , of what significance

is verbal approval

him
and

that's that everything looks good on paper.
Everything we have done so far and everything has

been

done and now we just have to go through the p r o c e s s
submitting it.

of

It was a big day to us because all of

that work had been done and we were at this point
feeling pretty good about t h i n g s .
Q

During this period of time from the end of

June which is sort of w h e r e we left off in the

last

time frame to the time the verbal approval was

given

by the SBA, were there any discussions between you
M r . Fife about the time f r a m e s , about your

and

scheduling

needs and your concerns of the upcoming p r e s s u r e s , as
you have characterized
A

it?

It had increased from the first of
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until whenever this verbal approval was and I wish I
had the date.

The first of September or in A u g u s t .

It had consistently escalated.

I would relate to

Lee

that w e l l , I sure hope things go the way we had
planned because it was g o i n g to be t i g h t .

Then

—

here again, I don't want to jump ahead, but it had
gradually escalated to the p o i n t that he knew I was
very concerned about it.
mentioned

I don't know if Mike

it, but I had m e n t i o n e d to Mike that I was

worried about it.
Q
those

What did Lee respond when you told

him

things?
A

He's doing the b e s t he c a n .

Q

What other w o r d s do you recall M r . Fife

using between you and he as y o u discussed this
of the time
A

problem

pressures?
I don't want to say that he dismissed

because I know he was c o n c e r n e d .

it

He was on our s i d e .

He was concerned about t h i n g s , but it was always
it doesn't exist, like we w o u l d deal with it.
as specifically what he s a i d , probably saying

like

As

far

nothing

said it a l l .
Q

Did he give you any commitment during

period of time as to when it would be available
w h e n it would be completed or when it would be
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A

Soon.

That would be Lee's commitment.

Q

Do you recall him using that word?

A

Yes , soon.

Q

Anything else on that topic that you

being discussed between y o u and M r . Fife during
time

recall
that

period?
A

No.

That would be it through when we got

the verbal.
Q

Tell me what you did after you got the

verbal from that meeting in M r . Fife's
A

office?

Spent a week of not seeing Lee and

waiting

for the official notification.
Q

Who was finishing up the paperwork at that

A

That would have b e e n between Lee and I, but

time?

I think he had most of i t .

M i k e and he would

talk

periodically on the phone about getting this form or
that form from East Troy.

At this p o i n t , the

corporate thing came into it.

We had pretty

much

finished with my day to day or week to week, or
whatever.

So about a week following that v e r b a l ,

things were pretty good.
Q

Were you involved

in the n u m b e r s ; that i s ,

how much they were going to b o r r o w , how it was
to be paid back, what the interest rates were
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A

Right,

Q

What happened n e x t ?

of significance that you
A

What's the next

remember?

The next time I saw L e e , I went in and

asked him how long it was going to be before we
the money.

event

That was the big

got

question.

Q

What was his

answer?

A

Number o n e , h o w was he coming and had

gotten the paperwork s u b m i t t e d , the

he

application

formalized and submitted, w h i c h , I think he h a d , at
that point.

It was a r e l a t i v e l y

fast p r o c e d u r e .

Q

When did that c o n v e r s a t i o n take

A

That would h a v e been about a week

t h a t , so here again, b a s e d on that v e r b a l ,

place?
after

September

1st.
Q

Roughly?

A

Yes.

Q

What was M r . F i f e ' s response to your

inquiries?
A

Soon.

It w o u l d be soon.

The process —

as

soon as the SBA got the p a c k a g e and I think he may
have even been going to take it up there which was a
common thing.

He was g o i n g to Salt Lake a l o t .

here again, I can't say he told me to relax and
worry about it, but he said s o o n .

So this would
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another week shot in my m i n d .

At this point, I was

starting to get the idea that a week here and a week
there and that's the type of thing I would tell him, a
day here or a week here or as days stretch into w e e k s ,
those are the kind of things I'm worried about as far
as getting started here because depending on the
w e a t h e r , I have seen Decembers

in New Castle as

witnessed there this y e a r , that it can be pretty
to the point where you c o u l d n ' t do anything.
what I was just petrified

That w a s

of.

Q

Did you express to him those

A

Yes.

Q

What was his

A

What could he say?

respond to it.

bad,

concerns?

response?
He didn't

really

He listened to me intently and w e l l ,

we will do the best we can type of thing.

He never

said anything like, o h , don't worry about it or
anything like that, but he basically

--

Q

Really, that's all he could have

A

Yeah.

said?

I was p r o b a b l y whining at the w r o n g

guy at that point.
Q

Then what was the next thing of

significance that h a p p e n e d , as best you recall?
A

After, I t h i n k , probably -- or I know v e r y

soon afterwards and I w o u l d guess this to be
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the 15th of September or m a y b e even the 1st.
Somewhere between the 1st and the 15th we got
written approval from the SBA.

We are in.

As far

I was concerned, that was as good as a check.
they said, okay, so let's g o .

the
as

I mean

I went in to see L e e ,

here again, to press him and to find out when we

were

going to do this, when we were going to be able to

get

going.
Q

When you say you w e n t in to see L e e , did

you know the SBA had given w r i t t e n
A

Yes.

the m a i l .

approval?

He had called me and had gotten it in

He was up there and got it or up there

knew that they sent it.

So there was a three

and

day

period in there, again, another three days w h e r e

we

k n e w it was coming, but he had to get it type of
thing.

So he did get it.

Q

So then you w e n t into his

office?

A

Yes.

Q

Who was present in that

A

Just Lee and I.

Q

What was said and by

A

I was asking him w h a t the process was

conversation?

whom?
in

g e t t i n g the money to get s t a r t e d , how to proceed

here

to make plans in getting some p e o p l e on the site

and

he answered to the question when I asked him w h e n
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were going to get the m o n e y , it w a s , he didn't know

at

which point I really started to press him, probably a
little bit too vigorously these delays would cause

—

Q

What did you

say?

A

I would just go back over the point t h a t

if

we get delayed here too m u c h longer, it's going to be
a matter of getting into the winter time and that's
going to cost us more money to build.
delay us into the spring.
aware.

It's going

to

I made him aware and he w a s

Here again, I was covering the same ground

every time, of what this was going to do.

At that

p o i n t , he basically just reached over and grabbed

the

w h o l e SBA package, sat it in front of me and said,

"Go

see if you can peddle it to another bank."
Q

Did he explain to you what that meant?

A

No.

Here a g a i n , to me it was a check

was made out that nobody had endorsed.
I looked at it.
he did that.

I didn't know why.

No clue at that p o i n t .

That's the way

I had no idea

I t h o u g h t maybe if some

money

other

bank took it, took the loan for State Bank, that
w o u l d still have it in some w a y .

why

I was glad.

G o s h , here I might be able to do it and get the
soon to get started.

that

they

I had no idea why

this was happening other than the fact when I did

go

to the other bank, they all looked at me pretty
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anybody else that we s h o u l d n ' t believe that
events were going to happen in a certain
fashion and they h a d n ' t .

certain

timely

So for lack of a better

term, be gun shy at that p o i n t .
Q

You said you were led to believe

certain things would h a p p e n .

I would

that

like to k n o w

specifically what things you were led to believe
happen and what led you to believe they would

would

happen.

Take them one at a t i m e .
A

The simple fact that no one led us to

b e l i e v e that they w o u l d n ' t h a p p e n .
Q

Let's put the horse ahead of the c a r t .

W h a t things were going to
A

happen?

That right from the beginning that the

a p p r o v a l would be c o m i n g , that the funds would be
a v a i l a b l e soon.

That's i t .

That's the q u o t e .

it looked great with regard to the approval of
package.
Q

I mean that's certainly

So those are the two t h i n g s .

The

That
the

SBA

t h i n g s that you were led to believe that would
A

Oh, y e s .

Q

Anything else that you were led to

A

made

--

approval and the funding of the loan were the

t h a t would

SBA

two
happen?

believe

happen?
No.
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Q

The things that led you to believe

that

w e r e , and I'm saying this as broadly as I c a n , from
what you said in your f a v o r , that the bank knew

about

your scheduling requirements because of the pro

formas

that you had given to them and also because of the
statements that you began to make to Mr. Fife

starting

in the first of July?
A

Yes.

Q

Mr. Fife had said s o o n , it looked

good,

coupled with the periodic reports on the s p e c i f i c s ;
that i s , the appraisal is in, this is in and that's
and those sorts of t h i n g s .

Anything else that you

in
can

think of that led you to b e l i e v e , in your w o r d s , t h a t
the SBA approval would be given and the funding of

the

loan would be completed?
A

No.

Q

Other than the pro forma statement

showing

the dates and your statements to M r . Fife about

the

d a t e s , there was never a c o m m i t m e n t from the bank
to when the funding would be
A

as

available?

W e l l , the way we looked at it and m a y b e

it's relevant and maybe it isn't -Q

The way you looked at it is relevant.

A

That if you propose to do that pro

forma,

in a narrative situation, is that if you apply for a
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206
(Examination by Mr. Higbee)

as soon as we get that, that the bank can p r o c e s s

the

stuff, that we can get at least a preliminary
construction

loan and we can start construction.

now we were at a point w h e r e , given our

And

construction,

you know, schedule, you know, we're starting to

push

it.
Q.

Okay.

You said you were given

the

impression that that could take p l a c e , that
construction

funds could be advanced

the

immediately.

Did

the bank ever say or do anything directly with y o u ,
not through M a r k e l l , but directly with you, to give
you the impression that the funds could be
right

advanced

away?
A.

I don't recall a specific conversation

Lee told me personally, or anybody at the bank
personally that —

where

said

I was the paperwork signer, I was

the conceptual developer, and I was party to the
conceptual

approvals or a g r e e m e n t s , and inherent

those agreements and in those discussions was
construction scenario, which to our mind was

this
nothing

-- this is rather standard, I mean, just common
will tell you that that schedule has to be
adhered to.

in

sense

reasonably

Again, there was leeway built into

it,

and it could slip some, but we just -- all along

after

we got the v e r b a l , that's what we were b o t h , Jim

and
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1

I, were concerned about, is if we're going

2

building

3

that's what

4

or Lee speci!

5
6

juess it's not so much

hit

the bank

said to m e ; it's what he didn't
t i I

i itest,

the end of August,

we wo

he didn't say it; you assumed

Q.

was mistake]

ie would have ample o p p o r t m I

correct my '
Q.

it?

based on the fact that if I

A.

11

be

August at the latest and

gave me the impression that,

i j

i

> .--•

koy.

12

closi ng, U P . ,

1

exactly where v ^

3

too late, we

1

^.

to

ytion.

We come

"~ to

'ctober.
^ere.

f

h e t i me

At that poir::: , you U-.-t-w

Did you tell
j.i\y

,

:'s

more"?

No •

16
A.
18

••• ' ahead and did

hindsight,
ie.

...

n

t decision that I ever

By that point we had too much money

=*d ~ -rw r>"

x \.o

: aere com.

.istruction that was hired
f

it anyway.

,

doing the

specifically

l

U

n'

asi
Q.

Who's that?

A.

Mike LafJ in.

e concept, tiu
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(Examination by Mr.

Higbee)

could only slip so much.
Q.

Did the bank ever say, in effect or

similar to t h i s ,

"Okay, we agree that we will

loan in time to meet with your
A.

anything
fund

the

schedule"?

I don't remember an exact

conversation.

Maybe they had one with Jim, or maybe said

something

to that effect to him, but not directly to m e .
Q.
the money?
A.

By what date was the bank committed

to

loan

You're saying by the 31st of August?
That was the date that everybody

—

or end

of August, something to that effect, was the date
everybody was agreeing to, either by stating

it, at

least in our case, on a regular basis, or by the
that they never —
otherwise.

the bank never said

that

fact

anything

In other w o r d s , even if they didn't say

it

would be this particular date, they were well aware

of

the schedule; they had ample opportunity to say,
"That's just not realistic.

We don't think we can do

it by then" or, "No, you guys are unrealistic.
thing

isn't going to get done until October."

had every opportunity

t o , if our assumption and

we were telling them was naive or a bad
they had every opportunity

This
They
what

assumption,

to set us straight, and

they never did.
Q.

So you're saying, then, if I understand
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A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

-- '

tted

uu loan Troy the amount ul

$325,000 upon approval by the SBA "

When was

that

: : iiiiii:ii I:iiit• = i :t t 1 1 i a t ^ • : i i allege made?
Now, y o u f r n

MR. CALL:

ygro?

asking him

that

Because we're going to

have problems here, because some of the

information

cers of Troy.
Based

the best knowledge that you

have

resent time, as you sit here,
he commitment that you referred

The commitment was made, tLierent

in Paragraph

my k n o w l e d g e , as

lucin :: r r: 1 icat ion

art o

package and the narrative that went along with
here we

*

anu then iil

egular discussions with them, that
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either
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(Examination by M r .

Higbee)

could only slip so much.
Q.

Did the bank ever say, in effect or

similar to this,

"Okay, we agree that we will

loan in time to meet with your
A.

anything
fund

the

schedule 11 ?

I don't remember an exact

conversation.

Maybe they had one with Jim, or maybe said

something

to that effect to him, but not directly to m e .
Q.
the money?
A.

By what date was the bank committed

to

loan

You're saying by the 31st of August?
That was the date that everybody

of August, something

—

or end

to that effect, was the date

everybody was agreeing

to, either by stating

it, at

least in our c a s e , on a regular basis, or by the
that they never —
otherwise.

the bank never said

that

fact

anything

In other w o r d s , even if they didn't

say

it

would be this p a r t i c u l a r d a t e , they were well aware of
the schedule; they had ample opportunity to say,
"That's just not realistic.

We don't think we can do

it by then" or, "No, you guys are unrealistic.
thing isn't going to get done until October."
had every opportunity

t o , if our assumption and

we were telling them was naive or a bad
they had every opportunity

This
They
what

assumption,

to set us straight,

and

they never did.
Q.

So you're saying, then, if I understand
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vou said correctly, that you're not aware of the bank
ever saying that they would meet your schedule, but
\.:.ey did not say that they wouldn't, based on all

the

facts that were available to them?
A.

Yes, as far as with me personally.

Q.

Okay

No \ /, it's importan t

L;:e bank committed

Well

that

to loan the money, and you say

that's the end of August
A.

the date

sometime?

t depends

n what -- I aon-i

really

10

know w 1 i a t would b e , from a legal standpoint, def in e d

1

as whei I tl n

.

Th»

know, first you get an approval

1.

from Lee.

L • : r i = ; e I! • = i : y I

13

say

14

:••

15

i

16

point where he runs it

order; and I

He
- e in s

in the meantime, r.c ' .-.

the board.

17
18

really remember when that w a s .

1"

i: e a ] ] ;; I: I a ,„ :i t • : • 1 : = 1: • e f c • i : • =
the SBA

It was before 11: l e applicai

I believe the board approved

it.

: c>. ,irse,

s u b j e c !:: t: • : • 1 1 i e 1 o a
Q.
AugustA.

Which was given sometime around the end

of

as T remember?
Yes, I believe

application

w e l l , yeah, the

- - finally, Lee said, f i i I a 1 1 y ,
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HKGLAR RANCH, INC., an Idaho Corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.

committed harmful act which put initial
party in fear such as to compel him to act
against his will.
4. Bills and Notes c^Ji'JO

U o n a r d M. STILLMAN and Juanita P.
Stillman, husband and wife,
Defendants and Appellants.
No. 16830.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 12. 1980.

Purchasers appealed summary judgment of the Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, Homer F. Wilkinson, J., on promissory note, contending that factual issue was
raised by their defense of duress which
made summary judgment inappropriate.
The Supreme Court, Hall, J., held that purchasers failed to prove duress.
Affirmed.

1. Judgment <£=» 181(2. 3)
Summary judgment is appropriate if
pleadings and all other submissions, including depositions, answers to interrogatories,
admissions, and affidavits show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that moving party is entitled to judgment as matter of law. Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 56(c).
2. Judgment <*=» 181(2)
Rule that summary judgment is appropriate if pleadings and all other submissions
show that there is no genuine issue as to
material fact and that moving party is entitled to judgment as matter of law does not
preclude summary judgment simply whenever some fact remains in dispute, but only
when a material fact is genuinely controverted. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
56(c).
3. Contracts c=>95(l)
To invalidate a contract, a party thereto must show that other contracting party

EXHIBIT
D-4

Purchasers failed to prove duress as
(iefense to action involving promissory note,
execution of which was condition imposed
uj>on purchasers l>efore entering into a
second real estate agreement after they had
failed to perform first agreement, where
purchasers failed in any way to demonstrate how it was wrongful for vendor to
follow advice of counsel and impose conditions upon reinstatement of real estate
agreement so as to insure against further
financial loss in event of second failure to
j>erform contract, and purchasers were not
placed in such fear as would have deprived
them of their frt'e will since, by one purchaser's own admission, had purchasers chosen to walk away from negotiations, only
consequence thereof would have been loss
of whatever benefits deal might have afforded them had it l>een closed.

Robert R Brown, Salt Lake City, for
defendants and appellants.
George N Larsen, James F. Shepherd,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff-respondent
HALL, Justice:
Defendants appeal the summary judgment of the district court on a promissory
note, contending that a factual issue was
raised by their defense of duress which
made summary judgment inappropriate.
Defendant Juanita Stillman contracted
with plaintiff on May 12, 1978, to purchase
certain land located in West Jordan, Utah.
The purchase entailed plaintiff's acquisition
of the subject land from one Rosella Woods
by means of a land exchange. By the
terms of the contract and escrow agreement executed by the parties, the purchase
was to l>e closed the same day by payment
over to the escrow agent of the full pur-

HEGLAR RANCH, NC. v. STILLMAN
Cite as, Utah.

chase price of $704,000 in return for delivery of a warranty deed to the property.
There was a failure of performance on
the part of defendant Juanita Stillman occasioned by her inability to secure the funds
with which to pay the purchase price, and
the escrow was therefore terminated. A
short time thereafter, defendant Juanita
Stillman advised plaintiff of the further
prospect of financing and of her desire to
reinstate the agreement. On June 21, 1978,
plaintiff, through legal counsel, informed
defendants of its willingness to reinstate
the prior agreement, conditioned upon the
execution by both defendants of two promissory notes in the amount of $25,000 each,
one being the note that is the subject of this
lawsuit, and the other payable to Rosella
Woods. As a further condition of reinstatement, in the event defendant Juanita Stillman should again fail to .perform by June
29, 1978, the agreement would again be
terminated and the escrow documents, including the promissory notes, would be delivered to plaintiff as stipulated damages.
Defendants balked at the conditions imposed and sought to be relieved thereof by
telephoning plaintiff's president, Mr. Max
Gillette, who disclaimed any knowledge of
the imposition of such conditions, but did
agree to look into the matter.
Defendants' additional efforts to contact
Gillette failed, and on June 23, 1978, they
appeared in the office of the escrow agent
with their own legal counsel, at which time
they executed the supplemental escrow
agreement, including the promissory notes,
although they did so under protest.
Defendant Juanita Stillman again failed
to pay over the purchase price, and this
action on the note payable to plaintiff was
instituted. Based on the pleadings, affidavits, depositions of the defendants, and other supporting documents, plaintiff's motion
I. Including depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, affidavits, etc.
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for summary judgment was granted by the
trial court.
[1] Summary judgment is appropriate if
the pleadings and all other submissions *
show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.2
[2] The foregoing rule does not preclude
summary judgment simply whenever some
fact remains in dispute, but only when a
material fact is genuinely controverted.3
[3] The rule regarding the avoidance of
contractual obligations by reason of duress
is as set forth in the case of Fox v.
Picrcey:4
. . . any wrongful act or threat which
actually puts the victim in such fear as to
compel him to act against his will constitutes duress.
Thus, to invalidate a contract, a party
thereto must show (1) that the other contracting party committed a wrongful act (2)
which put the initial party in fear (3) such
as to compel him to act against his will.
(4] Viewed in light of the above requirements, defendants* contention is wholly without merit that a material issue of
fact has been raised, the resolution of which
could constitute the defense of duress. Defendants have simply failed to in any way
demonstrate how it was wrongful for plaintiff to follow the advice of counsel and thus
impose conditions upon the reinstatement
of the agreements, so as to insure against
further financial loss in the event of a
second failure to perform the contract.
Moreover, defendants were not placed in
such fear as would deprive them of their
free will-by defendant Juanita Stillman's
own admission, had they chosen to walk
away from the negotiations, the only conse3. Kesler v. Kesler, Utah. 583 P.2d 87 (1978).
citing Disabled American Veterans v. Hendrixson, 9 Utah 2d 152. 340 P.2d 416 (!959).

2. Rule 56(c). Rules of Civil Procedure.
4. 119 Utah 367. 227 P.2d 763 (1951).

{92

Utah

619 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

tence thereof would have Iwen the loss of
hatever benefits the deal might have af>rded them had it IK-en closed. To label as
luress" such incentive to complete the
-ansaction would have the effect of pers u i n g any party to avoid a contractual
bligation on the ground that performance
.'as agreed to only because, in the absence
f such a promise, the party would be delied the benefit of a bargain. Such a deense is entirely foreign to the established
aw of contracts.
Affirmed.

Costs to plaintiff.

CROCKETT, C. J., WILKINS and
STEWART, J J., and R. L. TUCKETT,
Retired Justice.
MA UGH AN,
herein.

J.,

does

not

participate

